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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals is conferred by virtue of Section 
-7&*2a 3 (g), Utah Code Annotated. 1953. as amended. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RITA C. GUM, * 
Plaintiff and Appellant, * 
* Court of Appeals 
* No. 90-0528-CA 
-vs- * 
* 
JAMES RICHARD GUM, * Priority Classification 
* No. 14 Cb) 
Defendant and Respondent. * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final Decree of Divorce of the Third Judicial 
District Court entered on September 10, 1990. 
No Cross-Appeal has been filed. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented by this appeal are: 
1. Is the evidence sufficient to support Findings of Fact #4 made 
by the District Court and did the trial court error in awarding a mutual 
Decree of Divorce, (A-22), upon grounds of irreconcilable differences when 
the evidence indicated that the wife could have the Decree of Divorce, (A-
22), awarded to her from the husband upon many grounds, such as acts, 
declarations, and conduct conjunctively constituting extreme mental and 
physical cruelty, desertion, gross neglect of duty, extremely argumentative, 
extremely authoritarian conduct, violent and ungovernable temper, bodily 
acts, violent and threatening conduct, harsh, humiliating demeanor, 
incompatibility with conflicts in personalities and disposition so deep as to 
be irreconcilable and to render it impossible for the parties to continue 
normal marital relationship? 
2. Is the evidence sufficient to support Findings of Facts #7, #8 
and #9 made by the District Court and did the trial court error in the 
amount awarded under the provisions of the Uniform Child Support 
Schedules for two children in light of the true incomes of both parties? 
3. Did the trial court err in refusing to take judicial notice of the 
evidence submitted at the hearing and in not awarding alimony to the wife 
thereby erroneously failing to maintain the wife's standard of living and in 
not addressing the wife's ability to support herself or provide the 
necessary financial facts to support the no alimony award and in refusing 
to consider such evidence in arriving at its judgment? 
4. Did the trial court err in refusing to take into consideration all 
the mutual property of the parties including the second home and in not 
giving the wife an interest therein, and in not dividing all mutual property, 
Facts #11, #12, #13 and #14 in a more equitable manner and in failing to 
enter Findings of Facts to support Fact #14 in the division of property, 
awarding only the sum of Three Thousand Dollars from the proceeds of the 
sale of one home as total settlement of marital property and the return of 
property over which plaintiff had lost control? 
5. Did the trial court err in ordering that each party shall pay 
their separate costs and fees and refusing to take judicial notice of the 
evidence presented in not considering under Utah law, (1) the 
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reasonableness of the fee; (2) the need of the party to have his or her fee 
paid or contributed to; and (3) the ability of the party from whom the fee 
is being requested to contribute to or pay an attorney's fee award? 
6. Was the denial of the plaintiffs interest in and pertaining to 
Respondents benefit plans, retirement plans, savings, stock plans or other 
benefit plan whatsoever an error in law? 
7. Did the trial court err in placing undue emphasis on the quick 
sale of one of the parties' homes and not the other and was there an error 
in law in ordering plaintiff to move quickly from her home and forcing its 
sale at an unreasonable low price and in failing to consider all other factors 
in the court's determination? 
8. Did the conduct of the trial court constitute judicial bias? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The statutes relied upon by the Plaintiff are: 
Statutes 
1. Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated.. (1984), as amended. 
2. Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
3. Section 30-3-6, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
4. Section 30-3-7, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
5. Section 30-3-10, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
6. Section 30-3-10.6, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
7. Section 30-4-1, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
8. Section 30-4-3, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
9. Section 30-6-2, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
10. Section 30-6-4, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
11. Section 62A-4-502, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
12. Section 78-2a-3 (g), Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended. 
United States Constitution 
13. Section 1, 14th Amendment. 
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Rules 
14. Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
15. Rule 201 (d), (f), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
16. Rule 701, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
17. Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
18. Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Cases 
19. Fletcher v. Fletcher. 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980). 
20. Gramme v. Gramme. 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978). 
21. Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 436 (Utah 1986). 
22. Saint v. Saint. 411 P.2d 683, 196 Kan. 330 (Kan. 1966). 
23. Gardner v. Gardner. 512 P.2d 84, 85 N.M. 324 (N.M. 1973). 
24. Fite v. Fite. 479 P.2d 560, 3 Wash.App.726 (Wash.App. 1970). 
25. McCov v. McCov. 429 P.2d 999 (Okl. 1967). 
26. Countryman v. Countryman. 659 P.2d 663, 135 Ariz. 110. 
27. Christopher v. Christopher. 381 P.2d 115, 62 Wash.2d 82. 
(Wash. 1963) 
28. Brammer v. Brammer. 471 P.2d 58, 93 Idaho (Idaho 1970). 
29. Hofer v. Hofer. 427 P.2d 411, 247 Or. 82 (Or. 1967). 
30. Barrett v. Barrett. 403 P.2d 649, 17 Utah 2dl (Utah 1965). 
31. Laws v. Laws. 432 P.2d 632, 164 Colo. 80 (Colo. 1967). 
32. Montague v. Montague. 510 P.2d 901 (Colo.App. 1973). 
33. Foutch v.Foutch. 469 P.2d 2333, 2 Wash. App. 407. 
(Wash.App 1970) 
34. Kelso v. Kelso. 448 P.2d 499, 75 Wash.2d, 24 (Wash. 1968). 
35. Wick v. Wick. 489 P.2d 19, 107 Ariz.382 (Ariz. 1971). 
36. Hurn v. Hurn. 541 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1975). 
37. Matter of Marriage of Clapperton 649 P.2d 620, 58 Or.App. 577 
(Or.App. 1982). 
38. Wanberg v. Wanberg. 664 P.2d 568 (Alaska 1983). 
39. Christiansen v. Christiansen. 667 P.2d 592 (Utah 1983). 
40. Nesmith v. Nesmith. 540 P.2d 1229, 112 Ariz. 248 (Ariz. 1975). 
41. In re Marriage of Manzo. 659 P.2d 669 (Colo. 1983). 
42. Naranjo v. Naranjo. 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988). 
43. Ruhsam v. Ruhsam. 742 P.2d 123 (Utah App. 1987). 
44. Wiese v. Wiese. 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985). 
45 Fischer v. Fischer. 443 P.2d 463, 92 Idaho 379 (Idaho 1968). 
46. Hansen v..Hansen. 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975). 
47. Carter v. Carter. 379 P.2d 311, 191 Kan. 
48. Despain v. Despain. 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1980). 
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49. Dehm v. Dehm. 5545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976) 
50. Olson v. Olson. 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985) 
51. Newmever v. Newmever. 745 P.2d 276 (Utah 1987). 
52. Jones v. Jones.. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
53 Jones v. Jones 700 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1985). 
54. Canning v. Canning. 744 P.2d 325 (Utah App. 1987). 
55. Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989). 
56. Rashand v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988) 
57. English v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977). 
58. Talley v. Tallev. 739 P.2d 83 (Utah App. 1987). 
59. Bushell v. Bushell. 649 P.2d 85 (Utah 1982). 
60 Haslam v. Morrison. 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520. 523 (1948). 
61 Heltman v. Heltman. 511 P.2d 720 (Utah 1973). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case. Appellant, Rita C. Gum, and Respondent, James 
Richard Gum, were married in March 1982 and continued their state of 
matrimony for over eight (8) years. 
Before James and Rita were married she asked him if she should 
work and help support her girls. He said, "No you'll have enough to do to 
stay home and take care of me and the girls". 
At their wedding Rita was very much in love with her new husband. 
She had been married twice before, having two children with her 
first husband, a boy and girl, and four girls with her second. She enjoyed 
marriage and family. She had always worked hard to create a happy home 
and was a good and faithful wife, still both her marriages had ended in 
divorce. 
She knew —that this time she had found the right husband for her, 
he had two sons, and she anticipated a long and happy marriage. 
But, subsequent to their marriage, the parties have had a very 
stormy relationship; have been separated numerous times. 
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Trouble started on their Honeymoon when a sore appeared on her 
husband's penis. This caused them both concern, because it looked like a 
venereal infection. Rita had had a health examination before the wedding 
but James had not. Rita felt hurt and wanted to have the marriage 
annulled, but James talked her out of the idea. They abstained from 
sexual intercourse until the sore disappeared; which it did during the 
Honeymoon —then she also discovered he was semi-impotent. 
On their return home James went to an urologist for an examination 
and reported to Rita, that the Doctor said that he had an yeast infection. 
This allied Rita's fears as to how serious the venereal infection may be 
until she had a sore appear on her vagina several months later. 
Shortly after returning home from their Honeymoon new trouble 
developed over James' twenty eight (28) year old son of a previous 
marriage Jim, who was living with his father. Jim had deep physiological 
problems. Previous to the marriage Rita had suggested to James that he 
should get physiological help for Jim; who had left two suicidal notes. 
They had agreed before the marriage that Jim would move after a 
short time. Rita didn't realize the extent of Jim's problems. Jim was 
allowed to stay for more than nine months. He was strongly dependent on 
his father, did not work, pay rent or contribute to his care. 
Rita gave her old car (American Rebel) to Jim. Jim was angry with 
his father for marrying Rita and smashed the car into the curb in a fit of 
anger. The car was totaled, and had to be junked. 
James and Jim didn't talk to each other. Jim would talk to Rita and 
cry about his problems with his father. Rita treated him with love, as she 
did her adult son Tommy. She became his support system, helped him get 
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back self esteem and confidence, until he was able to gain employment and 
move out on his own. 
In 1987 James and Rita bought a second house at 5685 South 3650 
West, Bennion, Utah 84118; mortgaging it through Western Mortgage Loan 
Corporation, (A-31). They rented this house to Jim. The rental agreement 
covered the mortgage payments. Rita was also able to get Jim and 
James's relationship on civil grounds again. Before moving Jim told Rita, 
"When I move out my father will take his frustrations out on you —he 
won't have me to take them out on anymore." This happened, James took 
his frustrations out on Rita; and also on the children. 
When James returned from work, in the evenings he would isolate 
himself in the main bedroom. This continued for approximately two years. 
While at home he wouldn't take any responsibility for disciplining the 
girls. Matter of fact he would hardly talk to them. 
Rita helped them with their homework and attended school 
conferences and etc. She would take them to the dentist. James wouldn't 
let her take them to the doctor for examinations. 
James would watch television and read the newspaper or a magazine 
in the bedroom. Rita had to go in to talk to him. He only came out to eat 
or go to work. She figured that he must be depressed over his deceased 
wife Pauline. She asked, "When are you going to start being married to me 
and stop living in the past?" 
She visited Bishop Hunter, her L.D.S. bishop. He was the director of 
psychology at Primary Children's Hospital. She told him that something 
was wrong with her. She couldn't wake her husband up to being alive and 
start being a husband. She told Bishop Hunter that my husband was a 
loner and wanted to be by himself. Because he stayed away from his 
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family I would stay in the bedroom with him. He asked me to try and get 
James to come with me and talk to him. James and Rita went to Bishop 
Hunter for counseling. James stopped going. He wanted Rita to change and 
declared that nothing was wrong with him, she would have to change. 
He would be upset with her and nice to the children. When he was 
upset with the children he was nice to Rita. He couldn't be nice to 
everyone at the same time. He could love only one person at a time. 
James wanted to adopt the four minor children, but there was 
trouble getting the consent of Rita's former husband, Joseph Blaine Bailey. 
Blaine owed Rita over Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000), with interest, in 
back child support. So a deal was made. To gain Blaine's permission for 
the adoption, James had Rita sign a statement forgiving her former 
husband of all back and future child support. James would "make it up to 
the girls and treat them as his own" he said. 
So James adopted Rita's four younger children (A-66). 
James appeared to be happy with his new family of four young 
daughters. He had two (2) adult sons from his previous marriage. But 
before the adoption he would pit Susan against Cynthia by being nice to 
one and then the other, by rejecting one or accepting one and putting the 
other down. 
One time he made their handicapped child, Susan, walk 7 miles from 
4500 South to 13th Ave; on the north side of the city. He said, "she got 
herself out there and she could get herself home." If Rita went to pick her 
up they would have had a big fight. She tried to avoid fights as they 
would go on for days, sometimes for weeks. 
Susan had blisters on her little feet and Rita cried. She wanted to 
leave James then, but where could she go with four children? 
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Rita had helped James fix up the home where he had lived since his 
first wife's death, but it was still too small for their large growing family. 
James had a good job with Union Pacific, earning an annual income of 
over Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000), and was looking forward to 
a good retirement. James wanted to remodel and make their home larger. 
Rita thought it would cost less if they sold the home and built or bought 
another, but James wanted to stay where they were. He and Rita signed a 
note with the Associated Title Company on June 29, 1984 (A-30) 
They paid off the old mortgage and proceeded with the remodeling. 
There were disagreements between them over the remodeling. The 
costs escalated, they took a second mortgage with Western Mortgage Loan 
Corporation and a third with Lincoln Service Corporation. 
He still picked on Susan, their oldest child. She had to get a job when 
she was sixteen to buy clothes, because he wouldn't buy any for her. He 
abused her once by throwing her to the floor and putting his knee in her 
crouch, pressing on her stomach so she couldn't breath. Susan didn't tell 
her mother about this until some time later. 
Rita tried hard for over eight years to make the marriage work, in 
spite of James' violent temper. Early in the marriage when he thought the 
children were too noisy at the dinning table he had a temper fit, throwing 
milk over the table and food. Another time when he was making ice-
cream he poured sugar and eggs on Rita's head because she wouldn't find a 
measuring cup for him. This happened in the presence of their daughter 
Amy. 
After about 4 to 5 years of visiting his deceased wife's grave with 
him to clean and put flowers on it, she refused to go, telling him that it was 
something she felt he should do alone. He then abused her physically by 
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dragging her from the kitchen to a living room chair, beating her with his 
fists making bruises on her neck and forehead, while their two younger 
children, Amy and Joy, watched. In this instance Rita called the Police. 
One cold winter evening around midnight, in a fit of anger, he pushed 
Rita out of their car with his foot at about 4th South and 5th East in Salt 
Lake City. He left her on the street to walk home in the cold as she had no 
money to make a phone call. She walked until she found a restaurant 
open, borrowed a dime and called Pamela, her oldest daughter, who came 
and took her home. James was sleeping when they arrived home. 
James would abuse Rita by putting her down while comparing her to 
his women friends and his deceased wife Pauline. He told Rita she "wasn't 
worth a pimple on Pauline's ass, you will never hold a candle to her." 
He thought Rita was jealous of his women friends and Pauline. She 
wasn't at all, it was just the way that he compared her to them in an 
abusive way. 
James had open heart surgery. That night he telephoned Rita about 
2 a.m. and told her, "I love you very much, I have been mean to you and 
the girls. I'm sorry —will you forgive me? Considering everything I love 
the girls too —tell them so." If he came out of this OK he would change 
and make it all up to us. He now admitted that that he was abusive to Rita 
and the girls. But he forgot all about it, when he recovered, and went back 
to his same old ways. 
After his operation his temper, frustration and paranoia got worse. 
He came at Rita with a golf club which he had hid under the bed to protect 
himself. From what? 
In the scuffle he broke her little toe. Their daughter Cynthia pulled 
him off of Rita. She went to Dr. Maddock who x-rayed her toe. Dr. 
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Maddock called the Y.M.C.A; making arrangements for Rita and the girls to 
stay there until he could have James admitted to the hospital to get his 
diabetics regulated. Rita and the girls stayed at the Y.M.C.A. for two weeks. 
A social worker interviewed Rita. They wanted her to press charges, but 
she didn't (A-33). 
Rita went home when Dr. Maddock couldn't get James to go to the 
hospital. Then too, her mother was flying out for a visit. 
James had Rita served for divorce while her mother was visiting. 
He dropped the suit —saying he would go with her to counseling. 
They went to Janice Nelsen, psychologist. When she found fault with 
James he wouldn't go anymore. 
James became more violent in his attacks on Rita. He put his hands 
around her neck shaking her head leaning her across the dresser and 
screaming "I wish I could kill you." Susan was watching in horror and 
shouting "please let mom go. dad!" 
Rita didn't know what they were fighting about. James threatened 
her with another divorce trial. She tried to stop him from leaving the 
house, standing in front of the bedroom door. He left to go to his lawyer. 
Rita went with Susan, to protective services, and filed a complaint for 
spouse abuse. She received a protective order, (A-37), and had James 
removed from their home for Sixty (60) days. He moved into their home 
in Bennion. 
James had Rita served the second time for divorce. 
James knew Rita didn't want to go through another divorce, so he 
used the judicial system to emotionally blackmail, coerce, frighten and 
control her into getting his way. 
1 1 
Rita wanted to visit her mother in the east. James said before he 
would let her go she would have to put Susan out of their home. He said 
he didn't like her: saying, "I will not live with her while you are gone. I 
will not let you have the money to visit your mother unless she is out of 
my house." 
Rita hadn't been east to visit for 20 years, so she moved Susan to an 
apartment close by, and brought her home when James moved out. 
James kicked their second to oldest daughter Cynthia out before her 
18th birthday: because she wouldn't finish high school. Rita didn't dare 
say anything. James made all the decisions in the home. 
Cynthia moved in with Susan, her sister, who lived in a dreary 
apartment on 7th South & 5th East. Rita later moved them into a better 
neighborhood; 243 South 600 East. 
James caused Rita more work and worry because of his demands and 
selfishness. 
He knew that she didn't want a divorce. She didn't think he really 
wanted a divorce either. His actions were just another form of abuse. She 
wanted to get away from his abuse but she didn't have anyplace to go or 
the financial means to move and support their four daughters. 
After filing for divorce the second time, to coerce Rita to do his will, 
he dropped the case. He came home promising to get marriage counseling. 
Rita found a psychologist, Gilbert L. Meier, at the University of Utah 
to help them. He gave them family and private counseling. James 
wouldn't talk about himself —it was always Rita's fault. He did admit that 
he treated the children badly, to get back at Rita. He wanted to hurt her 
and seemed to enjoy hurting them all. 
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Most of their big fights were over the way he disciplined the 
children. 
He shouted through-out his marriage " I want you out of my life, I 
wish I had never met you, I hate your guts." He verbally abused Rita, 
calling her a bitch or slut through-out most of their marriage. 
He wouldn't talk to the girls for days at a time and would ground 
them for weeks. He would lock them out in the cold or beat them with a 
belt; putting bruises and whelps on them. Then make them stay in their 
rooms without dinner. When he wasn't emotionally or physically abusing 
them he would just give them dirty looks or ignore them. 
The girls finely gave up on their new adopted father. They knew no 
way to get close to him and show their love. But, they did know they had 
to be exceptionally good to get him to love them. Their real father had 
rejected them, now their adopted father was doing the same. 
He told Rita that if the girls were to get clothes that she would have 
to get a job and buy them. If she wanted a car she would have to purchase 
it with her wages. 
She would drive him to work in the mornings and picked him up 
evenings; so that she would have the car to run errands during the day. 
James was always in chaos and no.one could have any peace. He 
never told the children he loved them; never praised them. He told Rita 
"the children are just like you. You have made brats out of them and they 
are going to be just like you when they grow up." Rita thought, whatever 
that meant. Was it because neither Rita or the children would take abuse 
without fighting back? 
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In the two separate divorce actions James filed against Rita, one case 
was filed March 26, 1987 and the complaint was amended October 12, 
1988. The second complaint he filed October 31, 1988. 
During this second complaint James moved again into their second 
home in Bennion, (A-31), staying for five months. He gave Rita no money 
for expenses or child support. She had to seek help from H.E.A.T. to pay 
her utilities. 
Rita was represented on the two divorce actions by Debbie Hann, 
Legal Aid, and James Medlin. James was represented by Glen M. Richman. 
Both cases were dropped. 
They were nearing the end when Rita was forced to find a job to 
cover expenses. James retired. He said, "I worked 40 years for this and I 
am not going to work anymore. You're going to have to work. I'm not 
going to give you anymore money because I earned it and you haven't 
worked any. Apparently James didn't think that what Rita did at home 
was work. James took Rita off their joint bank account. 
She had a hard time finding work with no job experience. She hadn't 
worked outside the home for many years. 
A friend obtained a job for her at the Hilton Hotel as a server; in the 
banquet service at $5.75 an hour. It was very heavy work, four to five 
hour shifts until 12 or 1 a.m., about three days a week. It bothered Rita's 
heart condition and at 53 years of age she didn't have the energy and 
fortitude she once had; she earned about Five Hundred dollars ($500.00) a 
month. Since James had taken her off the family checking account and 
gave her no money, she used her earnings to buy her necessities and 
clothes for the children. He called the money in the bank "his money" as 
he had "went out and earned it." She bought most of her clothes at D.I.'s. 
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On March 3, 1990 James moved from their home at 655 H Street, (A-
30), Salt Lake City into their other home at 5685 South 3650 West, in 
Bennion; as he had during his 1987 complaint, (A-31). It was vacant at the 
time. They had rented it to their son, Jim, who lived there approximately 
three months out of the year. 
The last straw was when he locked Amy, then 14 years old, out of 
the house in freezing weather; telling Joy if she let her in that he would 
ground her for three months. 
He started his manipulations again to be in control. Rita felt that he 
slept with "one eye open" to catch her doing something wrong. 
She tried to keep their marriage together because she knew that he 
had a bad heart. He was on a lot of medication. She tried to understand 
and live the oath they took when they were married, "through sickness 
and in health till death do we part." 
She gave her all, but couldn't sacrifice her girls and everything she 
believed in. Rita felt that he was such a perfectionist that no one could do 
enough to please him. 
The day he left Rita was sick in bed . She had just brought Amy back 
home. James asked Amy, "Are you home to visit or stay." Rita wouldn't 
fight with him that day. Amy and Joy can vouch for that. He wanted to 
have complete control of Amy. 
James didn't know what being married meant. He made Rita pay 
everyday of their marriage because HE put a roof over her and the 
children's heads. She lived under these conditions for the children's sake 
and she also still loved him. He took advantage of her love, playing with 
her emotions. He tried to do everything to rule her, not love her. All she 
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wanted was his LOVE, but he wasn't capable of love. He thought control of 
Rita and the children was loving them. Shouting, that she was a "Mooch." 
By now he had completely deserted and abandoned his wife and 
children; leaving them destitute and depending on Rita's part-time income 
from the Hilton Hotel for support. 
This was the last straw. Rita didn't know how she would support 
herself and the children, but she had had enough of James' tricks. She filed 
for divorce on March 8, 1990, (Verified Complaint), (A-l), which made 
James furious. He thought this would be the last thing she would do. 
On this third divorce complaint Rita was represented by H. Delbert 
Welker, paying him Nine Hundred Seventy Dollars ($970.00) from the sale 
of some items from their home. 
James then used the court, trying to force Rita to move from their 
home on H Street, (A-30). Without a signed Court Order for her to vacate 
her home, she would not move. She felt that the United States Constitution 
guaranteed her "Right" to stay safely in their home and to protect and care 
for herself and her children. Rita never expected to received such an 
"Order" from the Court, and too, she didn't have moving money. 
James and Rita jointly owned two houses. Rita and their three 
children, including Susan who is handicapped, lived in the Salt Lake City 
home (A-30). James lived alone in their Bennion home, (A-31), where he 
had moved; deserting and abandoning his family. He gave Rita no money 
to help her support the children or to pay any of the bills until May 1st 
when she received child support. 
When the issue of Rita moving from their home was raised by the court, 
there was no discussion of what Rita was to do with the children if she did 
move; though she had temporary custody. 
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The parties have not lived together since the third complaint was 
filed. 
Then Mr. Welker moved to California; withdrawing from the case . 
He didn't return any money that Rita had paid him; even though he hadn't 
completed her case as agreed. 
Rita then retained Earl S. Spafford, from the same law firm to 
represent her; paying him Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00). 
Rita's moving from their home was discused in the court. Rita was 
ordered to move within ten (10) days (Tr. p. 54, line 24 & A-57). 
When Rita was unable to leave their home, as she had no money to make 
the move, Mr. Spafford withdraw from her case. 
In a letter to Rita, dated July 19, 1990, he stated: 
"I cannot endorse your decision to defy the Court Order, 
This alone is a basis for Withdrawal." 
A letter from Earl S. Spafford to Glen M. Richman, James1 Attorney, 
dated July 18, 1990, stated: 
I have informed her of my intention to withdraw not yet 
mailed to her not yet (check letter) filed with the court. I will 
withhold acting on this matter for a few days, pending a reply 
from you. I am authorized to inform you that Rita will, upon 
payment of $3,000.00 vacate the home, execute an appropriate 
deed of conveyance to your client and stipulate the entry of a 
decree. Such offer would necessarily contemplate that she 
would have custody of the children and that there would be an 
appropriate order of support and a fair allocation of the 
personal property of the parties. 
Rita never received this Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000) or an 
appropriate order of support and a fair allocation of the personal property 
of the parties. 
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Rita had no money with which to pay another lawyer. So she 
decided to act, pro se, in her own defense. 
The Case had degenerated into a case of selling the Salt Lake City 
home on 655 H Street, (A-32), fast; a "Fire Sale" at any price, at that. Just 
get the house sold. But nothing was said of selling the other home at 5685 
South 3650 West, Bennion; (A-31), where James was living on his U.P 
Corporation Pension Plan payment of Three Thousand Ninety Five Dollars 
and 72 Cents ($3,095.72) a month; as he was now retired. 
Rita sold the home alright, for One Hundred and Eighteen Thousand 
Dollars ($118,000). She had two appraisals of over Two Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($200,000) each. But, with pressure from the Court she could not 
wait longer for the right buyer. The net proceeds were to be reported in 
full to Judge John Rokich by James for a determination by the Court as to a 
division. James reported part of the proceeds to Judge John Rokich who 
made a determination that Rita should receive $3,000 with stipulations. 
(A-64) [Emphasis added] 
James received a final check from the Lincoln Service Corporation, 
(A-46),. He requested Rita to indorse it and would not allow her see the 
face of the check. "It's a Two Thousand Dollar check." he said. She refused 
to endorse it. Rita received a photo-copy of the check from the Lincoln 
Service Corporation (A-46). The amount was Two Thousand Three 
Hundred Forty Five Dollars and Seventy Five Cents ($2.345,75). She was 
informed that it would not be accepted by the Lincoln Service Corporation 
without her endorsement. She was also told that the check would be 
invalid after ninety (90) days. She does not know what happened to the 
check. The law says that she should get half of it. (Nesmith v. Nesmith). 
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James is retired, receives a monthly U.P Corporation Pension Plan 
payment of Three Thousand Three Hundred Forty Five Dollars and Seventy 
Five Cents ($3,095.72), it may increase at age 60. He has had open heart 
surgery in 1987; is a serious diabetic and must receive insulin. 
Rita was employed by Hilton Hotel. She received Gross Earnings of 
Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Three Dollars and Nineteen Cents 
$5,373.19 for the year 11/28/89 to 12/02/90. She is no longer employed 
by the Hilton because the work proved to be to heavy for her serious heart 
condition. She got severe pains in her chest. She is also a serious diabetic, 
and like James must also receive insulin. 
The record includes the letter below from Thomas B. Keith, M.D. and 
a letter from Robert M. Maddock, Jr. M.D., F.A.C.P., dated 3/25/87. 
Mrs. Rita Gum has reported to me several injuries which 
she states were caused by her husband. On 3/25/87 she came 
to the office with a bruised L. foot. X-ray at Holy Cross Hospital 
revealed a fracture of proximal phalanyx of the 5th left toe. 
This occurred on 2/24/87 in scuffle with husband. According 
to Mrs. Gum, he has had severe problems controling his anger 
since heart surgery. He also may be having insulin reactions in 
the early morning hours as his anger seems greater when he 
first gets up. He has been offered help voluntarily, but refuses. 
Mrs. Gum fears for the safety of herself and children. The 
police have been called on 3 occasions in the past two months 
by one of the children, herself and a neighbor to report violent 
behavior on his part according to Mrs. Gum (A-33). 
A letter from Dr. Thomas B. Keith, M.D., dated November 2, 1989, 
reported: 
— Mrs. Gum has chest pain, which is probable due to 
mitral valve prolapse, which is present by physical 
examination and on echocardiogram. In addition to her mitral 
valve prolapse, the patient has diabetes melitus, which is 
treated by Dr. Robert Maddock (A-34). 
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Rita had placed her physical and mental condition in issue during her 
deposition on the 25th day of May, 1990. A subpoena was issued for a 
records deposition from her two doctors. Rita through her, then counsel, 
obtained an ex parte protective order quashing the deposition notices, but 
they were obtained at a later date. 
Rita was working two jobs, Hilton Hotel and Smith's, although she 
was suffering heart pains from her work. She is now unemployed. 
She receives child support payments from James of Five Hundred 
Fifty Four Dollars ($554.00) per month and no alimony. 
James took Rita off his health insurance. She has to buy insulin, 
needles and paraphernalia. He refused to pay Amy's $91.00 emergency 
dental service, because he "didn't have previous knowledge." Rita doesn't 
have money to complete needed work (A-44). 
He told Rita he's "paying only what the court ordered" and "My 
lawyer told me that the divorce is final." Apparently his lawyer, Glen M. 
Richman, isn't familiar with Section 30-3-7, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as 
amended, (A-60), and Section 30-3-8, Utah Code Annotated- 1953, as 
amended, (A-60). James said, "I trust my lawyer." 
He telephoned Rita, January 29th about completing the IRS child 
support exemption form. He had one and wanted to bring it over for her 
sign. She said, "go through your attorney or mail it too me." He became 
abusive and shouted, "You pathetic bitch. I hate your guts." And, slammed 
down the phone. Joy was on the other phone. Rita wants James' abuse 
stopped as provided by Section 30-6-2, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as 
amended. She doesn't have to take it anymore. 
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She received the IRS form in the mail; completed it, mailed a copy to 
Glen M. Richman, James Attorney, and filed a copy with the Court of 
Appeals disclaiming any responsibility if it is used before it is legal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO THIS APPEAL 
Trial courts have considerable discretion in adjusting the financial 
and property interest of parties in a divorce, and the decision of the trial 
court is presumed valid. Ruhsam v. Ruhsam. 742 P.2d 123 (Utah App. 
1987). This presumption is overcome where the appellant shows that the 
trial court misunderstood or misapplied the law resulting in substantial 
and prejudicial error; or that the evidence clearly preponderated against 
the findings; or that such a serious inequity occurred so as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion. l±. In determining whether an error has been 
made by the trial court, the appellate court may review both the facts and 
the law, Wiese v. Wiese. 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Trial was held on September 6, 1990, before the District Court, sitting 
without jury. 
Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law (A-ll) and a Decree of Divorce 
(22) were entered on September 10, 1990. 
Appellant filed an Affidavit of Impecuniosity, (A-65), and a Notice of 
Appeal, (A-27), on October 4, 1990. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks the following relief on appeal: 
1. For an Order reversing and vacating the trial court's award of a 
mutual Decree of Divorce, (A-22), and modifying the Decree granted below, 
ruling that the Appellant is awarded the Decree of Divorce upon the 
grounds of cruelty 
21 
2. Modifying the amount of child support awarded under the 
provisions of the Uniform Child Support Schedules for the two children in 
light of the true incomes of both parties and for an Order providing that 
Respondent pay the former husbands forgiven past child support to and 
including the children who have reached maturity. 
3. For an Order providing that permanent alimony be paid to 
appellant to thereby maintain her standard of living as in the marriage 
during the time Respondent was receiving his pension and addressing the 
matter of the Appellant's ability to support herself, 
4. For an Order providing an equitable division of all marital 
property including the second home which was not sold and in giving the 
Appellant a proper lien thereon and providing for the division of other 
marital property with the Appellant beyond the given sum of Three 
Thousand Dollars from the proceeds of the sale of one home as her 
settlement of marital property, adjusted with of a given fair dollar amount 
from her portion as settlement to Respondent for property over which she 
has lost control and can not return (the oriental sword, the hunting rifle 
and the binoculars) (A-35). 
5. For an Order providing that Respondent shall pay the 
Appellant's past trial court costs and fees as well as those of having to 
make this appeal, and to consider under Utah law, (1) the reasonableness 
of the fee; (2) the need of the Appellant to have her fee paid or 
contributed to; and (3) the ability of the Respondent from whom the fee is 
being requested to contribute to or pay an attorney's fee award. 
6. An Order for a fair share of interest to the Appellant in and 
pertaining to Respondent's benefit plans, retirement plans, savings, stock 
plans or any other benefit plan whatsoever as allowed in law. 
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7. A ruling that the trial court erred in placing undue emphasis 
on the quick sale of one of the parties' homes and not the other and that 
there was an error in law in ordering plaintiff to move quickly from her 
home and forcing its sale at an unreasonable low price and in failing to 
consider all other factors in the court's determination. 
8. A finding that the conduct of the District Court constituted 
judicial bias. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Marital History 
The parties were married on March 24, 1982 , in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah (p. 2, par. 2 - Record on Appeal). 
Rita was 46 years of age and James was 52 when they were married. 
During the marriage relationship, the parties have acquired 
investments which should be equitably divided (p. 3, par. 8 - Record on 
Appeal). 
Rita is the mother of two minor children who were adopted by 
defendant and are considered to be issue of the marital relationship, to wit: 
Amy Charmaine Gum (DOB 3/14/75) and Joy Charmaine Gum (DOB 
9/22/76) (p.2, par. 3 - Record on Appeal). 
On March 8, 1990, Rita filed a Complaint for divorce (pp. 2-4,-
Record on Appeal). 
Defendant moved out of the parties' place of residence (p. 7, par. 2 -
Record on Appeal). 
Defendant failed to provide for any expenses for plaintiff such that 
the house payment and all utilities will remain unpaid, if they are not paid 
by defendant (p. 7, par. 3.- Record on Appeal). 
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Defendant took plaintiffs name off all bank accounts and has 
withheld all marital assets and money from plaintiff except her part-time 
employment at the Hilton Hotel from which she earns $300 to $400 per 
month (p. 7, par. 4 - Record on Appeal). 
Plaintiff needed the home and furnishings to care for the children 
and $540.00 per month as temporary child support (p. 7, par. 5 - Record 
on Appeal). 
Rita is a fit and proper parent who should be awarded the care, 
custody and control of the minor children subject to defendant's 
reasonable visitation (p. 3, par. 5 - Record on Appeal). 
Defendant should maintain all health, accident and life insurance 
policies preserving the currently named beneficiaries until the youngest 
child reaches age 18. (p. 3, par. 13 - Record on Appeal). 
Rita is entitled to retirement income from defendant's employment 
when she is age 60, said retirement should be ordered by the Court (p. 3, 
par. 9 - Record on Appeal). 
On March 26, 1990, James filed an Answer and Counterclaim (pp. 12 
- 27 - Record on Appeal). 
ERA - Carlson & Company, Realtors, letter dated April 5, 1990: 
Rita Gum has been most cooperative in trying to get her 
home sold. She has provided a key for the front door, which is 
in a Realtors' key box. This makes the house accessible to all 
Realtors at any time. 
Rita has kept the property in a show-able condition and 
agreed to a price reduction in order to try to get the home sold 
(p. 188 - Record on Appeal). 
In May 1990 Rita received a copy of Order on Order to Show Cause 
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and Objections to Commissioner's Recommendation. ORDERS as follows: 
The plaintiff shall vacate the parties home on or before 
the 20th day of May, 1990 and the defendant shall take 
possession thereof (p. 62, par. 2 - Record on Appeal). 
This order should clearly be a violation of Rita's and the minor 
children's rights under the 14th Amendment of Section 1 of the United 
States Constitution as quoted (p. 44, par. 3 - Record on Appeal). 
The home was jointly owned by Rita and James (A-30) as well as 
the one at 5685 South 3650 West, Bennion, Utah, (A-31), which they 
bought and rented to Jim Gum, James son. 
Commissioner Peuler was also influenced by the fact that defendant 
was living in his son's home (the son was not there). He was not making 
any rental or mortgage payments on the home and was thus enjoying free 
housing (p. 51, par. 8 - Record on Appeal). 
The rental agreement was and still is making the mortgage payments 
and James is still living there. 
Commissioner Peuler stated that it would be in the best interests of 
the children for plaintiff and the children to stay in the home until the 
home is sold (p. 50, par. 5 - Record on Appeal). 
The Court's ruling that plaintiff move out of the home in Twenty 
days is not reasonable due to the fact that the children are in school until 
June 8 and such a move would disrupt the children's school and social 
activities (p. 51, par. 9 - Record on Appeal). 
On the 25th day of May, 1990 Rita was deposed and during said 
deposition she put her physical and medical condition into issue. She made 
a claim for alimony in her Complaint (p. 98, par. 2 - Record on Appeal). 
25 
Mr. Welker was sent a copy of the deposition notices and a letter 
dated May 30, 1990 which in part says: 
It appears it will be necessary to take the depositions of 
Dr. Keith and Dr. Maddock. (p. 100, par. 4 - Record on Appeal). 
Rita received a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel dated 31 day of May, 
1990 — on the grounds that he is permanently moving to California (p. 
Record on Appeal). 
Earl S. Spafford and L. Charles Spafford of the firm of Spafford and 
Spafford enter their appearance as her counsel June 12, 1990 (p. 81,-
Record on Appeal). 
There after it appears that Mr. Spafford entered an appearance 
signed the 12th day of June, presented an Ex Parte Motion to a judge not 
assigned to the case for a protective order, and received an Ex Parte 
Protective Order and Stay without any notification to plaintiffs counsel, 
(p. 100, par. 6 - Record on Appeal). 
Dr. Robert K. Maddock Jr., M.D. was served Subpoena Duces Tecum on 
13 June 90 (p. 120 - Record on Appeal). 
Dr. Thomas B. Keith, M.D. was not available for service (p. 117,-
Record on Appeal). 
Rita through her attorney Earl S. Spafford requests of the court oral 
argument on her Motion for Stay of Proceedings and for Rehearing, June 
18, 1990 (p.-45r- Record on Appeal). 
Rita- through her attorney^Earhff.r Spafford-requests -o£ the^eourt oral 
argument -on-her-Motion^ for Stay of Proceedings and ^or Rehearing, June 
18, 1990—(pr~95, * Reeord^on^AppealV 
M. 
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Despite the Order requiring the plaintiff to move from the home by 
the 20th day of May, she has refused to do so and is in disobedience of the 
Court Order, and remains in said home (p. 99, par. 3 - Record on Appeal). 
Defendant moves the Court for an Order to Show Cause requiring the 
plaintiff to show cause, if any she has, why she should not be required to 
immediately vacate the parties' home as required by earlier Court Order, 
and upon her failure to do so, why she should not be held in contempt and 
punished accordingly (p. 102, par. 13 - Record on Appeal). 
Defendant desires to have the medical records for the claimed 
treatment of plaintiff which she has put in issue, unless plaintiff forever 
waives any claim to alimony (p. 102, par. 11 - Record on Appeal). 
Defendant, James R. Gum, purchased a home in 1970 with his first 
wife who is now deceased. The majority of dispute in this action appears 
to revolve around the house which was clearly premarital property of the 
defendant (p. 122, par. 1 - Record on Appeal). 
But, this house became jointly owned by the two parties when they 
took a new mortgage on it making Rita also responsible for the payments. 
Defendant has agreed that any money additions accrued to his 
retirement during the marriage of the parties should be divided equally 
between the parties (p. 123, par. 9 - Record on Appeal). 
Plaintiff is impecunious. She has no resources with which to pay the 
costs of moving and no present ability to provide substitute housing for 
the minor children of the parties. Plaintiff is 54 years of age and in fragile 
health. CpL /#$j POA&~ y&^^J^ &rv ^^(Z^^C J 
Plaintiff made diligent inquiry in an effort to find adequate housing 
for herself and daughters without success. In this regard she has inquired 
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as to public shelters and was informed that housing is available only for a 
short term basis. £
 p, y ^ p^t ^ y^^U 0*. ^ a t a l j 
To move said minor children into a shelter environment would 
impact upon their schooling, their church activity, their social relationship 
and their welfare, and would not be in their best interest (p. 148, par. 6 -
8 - Record on Appeal) (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff, Rita C. Gum, is to vacate the home of the parties where she 
has been residing, located at 655 H Street, (A-30), Salt Lake City, Utah, 
within ten (10) days from the 11th day of July, 1990; that on or before the 
21st day of July, 1990. 
Immediately after the date the plaintiff vacates the home, the 
defendant may occupy the home for a period of thirty (30) days for the 
purpose of getting the home ready for sale. The defendant must vacate 
the home within thirty (30) days from his occupancy and the home must 
be sold within thirty (30) days thereafter. £ # J&£ pfasJl~/Q££*kdL fa d/^fudJ 
The depositions of Dr. Keith and Dr. Maddock may be taken, and the 
records obtained. £ ^ / £ ^ ^ 
The difference in the refund from the two returns, that is the savings 
or additional refund received by filing joint return, is to be paid over to 
the plaintiff (p. 168, par. 0 - 4 - Record on Appeal). 
The court, having received Motion for an Order to withdraw, good 
cause appearing therefore, it is hereby ORDERED: 
Earl S, Spafford of the firm of SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, a 
Professional Corporation, attorneys for the Plaintiff, Rita Gum, 
are to withdraw as attorney of record in the above entitled 
matter. Dated this 30 day of July, 1990 (p. 165 - Record on 
Appeal). 
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Rita sold the house herself at a "give away price" of One Hundred and 
Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($118,000). She had two appraisals of over Two 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000). 
Rita filed a Supplement to Complaint and Partial Response to 
Defendant's Counter Offer, (A-48), of July 25, 1990: 
My attorneys have withdrawn, and I am so depleted 
financially that I am unable to incur further attorney's 
expenses, and therefore choose to represent myself and file 
this for myself (p. 173 - Record on Appeal & A-47). 
She was also exhausted and depleted emotionally. She was willing to 
do almost anything to get the divorce over with. She was willing to let 
James be awarded the divorce. Let him have custody of the children if 
they choose. She had sold the family home herself or gave it away; let 
the court decide how to divide the money. She was agreeable in letting the 
court determine the amount of child support. She only requested "that the 
court, after full examination and consideration, resolve them as his sense 
of equity and justice dictate." 
What did the court's sense of equity and justice dictate? 
Rita was handed the Trial Brief, (A-5), in court by Glen M. Richman, 
the Defendant's Attorney, with n<? chance t9 read it beforehand-
It is headed: 
Glen M. Richman, (2757) 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
RITA B. GUM 
Plaintiff, 
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Can Mr. Richman represent both parties legally in Utah? Isn't this a 
conflict of interest? Maybe not. But isn't it like having the fox guard the 
hen-house (p. 178 - Record on Appeal)? 
The Decree for Divorce was headed the same way, the first paragraph 
read: 
1. Defendant is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce 
upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, to be final upon 
entry (p. 201, par. 1. - Record on Appeal & A-22). 
This clause could be expected from the Attorney for the Defendant. 
The Trial Brief, (A-l), which is headed, Attorneys for Plaintiff, is 
signed by GLENN M. RICHMAN, Attorney for Defendant (p. 182 - Record on 
Appeal) [Emphasis added] 
Judge John A. Rokich changed this paragraph (handwritten) to read: 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby awarded a 
mutual Decree of Divorce upon the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences, to be final upon entry (p. 201, par. 1. - Record on 
Appeal & & A-22). 
Trial Proceedings 
The record in this case is voluminous due in large part to the fact 
that the plaintiff did not have funds to move from her home on H Street, 
(A-30). Substantial portions of the record deal with this issue and no 
provisions of funds were made to help her move. 
At the conclusion of what appears to be a very unorthodox and 
disjointed trial proceeding, the trial court allowed the defendant's attorney. 
Glen M. Richman, to prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
(A-11), as Attorneys for Plaintiff which alone should make the divorce 
invalid (p. 189 - Record on Appeal & A-ll). 
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This Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (A-ll), was handed to 
the plaintiff in court, September 6, 1990, the day of the trial with no 
opportunity before-hand to read it. 
On October 4, 1990, Rita filed a Notice of Appeal (p. 207 - Record on 
Appeal). No Cross-Appeal has been filed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT 
FINDINGS OF FACT #1, BUT RATHER THE DIVORCE SHOULD BE AWARDED TO 
THE PLAINTIFF ON NEW GROUNDS OF CRUELTY, (p. 201, par. 1 - Record on 
Appeal) 
The Appellant in bringing her action for divorce felt that a Decree of 
Divorce could be awarded to her from Respondent upon many grounds; 
covered in the factual background above. 
Plaintiff elected to file on grounds of irreconcilable differences and 
felt that she would be dealt with fairly. This was not the case. 
Plaintiff now seeks an order of this Court modifying the Decree 
granted below; asking that a Decree of Divorce, be granted her on the 
grounds of cruelty. 
POINT II: 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT 
FINDINGS OF FACT #9, BUT RATHER, DEFENDANT IS ABLE TO SUPPORT THE 
MINOR CHILDREN MORE EST THE MANNER THAT THEY WERE ACCUSTOMED 
DURING THE MARRIAGE AND THE COURT SHOULD SO ORDER, (p. 201, par. 3 
- Record on Appeal) 
See Decree of Adoption dated the 4th day of September 1984 (A-66). 
POINT III: 
THE DENIAL OF ALIMONY TO PLAINTIFF WAS AN ERROR IN LAW, 
FACT #5, BUT RATHER DEFENDANT IS ABLE TO SUPPORT THE PLAINTIFF 
MORE IN THE MANNER THAT SHE WAS ACCUSTOMED TO DURING THE 
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MARRIAGE AND THE COURT SHOULD SO ORDER, (p. 202, par. 5 - Record on 
Appeal). 
The trial court erred in not awarding permanent alimony to Rita. 
Although Rita wanted to work outside the home and develop a career 
James did not want her to, but rather wanted her to stay home and attend 
to the children's and his needs as well as caring for their home. He felt his 
Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000) per year salary was adequate for 
their needs. In not making this award, the trial court erroneously failed to 
maintain the wife's standard of living which had already been lowered by 
James retirement. In addition, the trial courts Finding relative to not 
awarding alimony were fatally defective in that they did not address the 
wife's ability to support herself or provide the necessary financial facts to 
support the no alimony award. The Alimony award should be made in a 
fair manner. 
POINT IV: 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DIVIDING ALL THE MUTUAL 
PROPERTY FACTS #11, #12, #13 and # 14 IN A MORE EQUITABLE MANNER, 
INCLUDING THE SECOND HOME WHICH WAS NOT SOLD., BUT RATHER THIS 
DIVISION SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED AND AN EQUITABLE AWARD MADE 
TO THE PLAINTIFF, (p. 202, par. 6 - Record on Appeal) 
The Appellant has an interest in Property which was acquired during 
the marriage which is required by law to be divided equitably. 
POINT V: 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND SHOULD HAVE AWARDED PLAINTIFF HER COSTS 
AND FEES FOR HAVING TO TAKE THIS ACTION, FACT #9. (p. 203, par. 9 -
Record on Appeal) 
Under Utah law, the party requesting an award of attorney's fees has 
the burden of proving three elements: (1) the reasonableness of the fee; 
(2) the need of the party to have his or her fee paid or contributed to; and 
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(3) the ability of the party from whom the fee is being requested to 
contribute to or pay an attorney's fee award. In this case all three 
elements may have been present in terms of evidence in the record. The 
trial court erroneously required Rita to pay her attorney's fees when Rita 
had not the income nor the property to look to in order to pay such fee and 
had to proceed with her case pro se. As such, the trial court's attorney's 
fee order should be reversed and vacated and replaced with an order 
requiring James to pay her fees as well as those of this appeal. 
POINT VI: 
THE DENIAL OF THE PLAINTIFFS INTEREST IN AND ENTITLEMENT 
PERTAINING TO DEFENDANTS BENEFIT PLANS, RETIREMENT PLANS, 
THRIFT PLANS, SAVINGS, STOCK PLANS OR OTHER BENEFIT PLAN 
WHATSOEVER WAS AN ERROR IN LAW, FACT #12, AND SHOULD BE 
RECONSIDERED WITH AN EQUITABLE AWARD.MADE TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
(p. 194, par. 14 - Record on Appeal) 
POINT VII: 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PLACING UNDUE EMPHASIS ON THE 
QUICK SALE OF ONE OF THE PARTIES' HOMES AND NOT THE OTHER AND 
THERE WAS AN ERROR IN LAW IN ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO MOVE 
QUICKLY FROM HER HOME, FORCING ITS SALE AT AN UNREASONABLY LOW 
PRICE, AND IT SHOULD BE SO NOTED IN THE RECORD. 
The trial court failed to follow United States constitutional law. 
POINT VIII: 
THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL JUDGE CONSTITUTES JUDICIAL BIAS. 
This judicial bias is evident in the trial transcript. 
ARGUMENT 
I: THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO 
SUPPORT FINDINGS OF FACT #1, BUT RATHER THE DIVORCE 
SHOULD BE AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF ON NEW GROUNDS OF 
CRUELTY. 
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The Appellant in bringing her action for divorce felt that a Decree of 
Divorce could be awarded to her from Respondent upon many grounds 
The conduct of Respondent was over a period of many years with 
such as acts, declarations, and conduct conjunctively constituting extreme 
mental and physical cruelty, desertion, gross neglect of duty, extremely 
argumentative, extremely authoritarian conduct, violent and ungovernable 
temper, bodily acts, violent and threatening conduct, harsh, humiliating 
demeanor, incompatibility with conflicts in personalities and disposition so 
deep as to be irreconcilable and to render it impossible for the parties to 
continue normal marital relationship; all the above could be considered as 
cruelty. 
In the case of Fischer v. Fischer 443 P.2d 463, 92 Idalio 379 (Idaho 
1968)* the court stated: 
Course of offensive conduct by one spouse toward other, 
extending over period of years and resulting in grievous 
mental suffering to innocent party, will constitute ground for 
divorce, although isolated acts, separately and individually 
considered, may be regarded as trivial." Saint v. Saint 411 P.2d 
683. 196 Kan. 330 (Kan. 1966). Repeatedly angered at husband 
and thereupon retiring to basement or bedroom to pout and 
sulk for protracted periods and refusal to speak to or 
communicate with husband for days at a time constituted 
"extreme cruelty" within divorce statutes. Hansen v. Hansen 
537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975). Acts constituting cruel conduct 
sufficient to cause great mental stress and suffering, as grounds 
for divorce, need not be more aggravated or severe when 
directed toward the husband than when directed toward the 
wife. U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-2. Ultimate determination of whether 
conduct complained of constitutes mental cruelty warranting 
divorce depends on the effect of the conduct on the 
complaining party, which must be evaluated in light of the 
sensibilities of the individual party. 
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Again in the case of Oliphant v. Oliphant 435 P.2d 29, 72 Wash.2d 
666 (Wash. 1967). the court stated: 
Fact that divorced husband had treated wife cruelly and 
subjected her to personal indignities making her life 
burdensome and that he had been extremely argumentative 
with her and extremely authoritarian to her and to children, all 
of which caused her to become nervous and ill, justified divorce 
for cruel treatment. RCWA 26.08-020(5). 
In the historic case of Carter v. Carter 379 P2.d 311, 191 Kan. the 
court stated: 
Extreme cruelty as contemplated by divorce statute is not 
limited to acts of physical violence, nor need it connote 
viciousness, but only conduct which is unusual, disapproved 
and not conducive to normal acts in accepted society. Any 
unjustifiable and long-practiced course of conduct by one 
spouse toward other which utterly destroys legitimate ends 
and objects of matrimony constitutes extreme cruelty even 
though no physical or personal violence may be inflicted or 
threatened. 
Plaintiff now seeks an order of this Court modifying the Decree 
granted below. The plaintiff should be granted a Decree of Divorce, on the 
grounds of cruelty. 
II: THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO 
SUPPORT FINDINGS OF FACT #3, BUT RATHER, DEFENDANT IS 
ABLE TO SUPPORT THE MINOR CHILDREN MORE IN THE MANNER 
THAT THEY WERE ACCUSTOMED DURING THE MARRIAGE AND THE 
COURT SHOULD SO ORDER. 
The Decree of Adoption dated the 4th day of September 1984, states: 
. . .are adopted by James Richard Gum, with 
all rights and duties he would have to his own 
natural children, including to support, 
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maintain and educate them and treat them in 
all respects as his own children: and they to 
have all of the privileges and obligations of 
children and parent to him — (A-66). 
Section. 30-3-10.6, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended, codifies 
what is required of a father in the State of Utah. 
Child support doesn't necessarily end when a child is 18 years old as 
we see in the case of Montague v. Montague 510 P.2d 901 (Colo.App. 1973) 
The court stated: 
Where alimony was granted to wife in sum of 
$475 per month to enable her to maintain a home, 
and trust for college education of children provided 
not only strictly educational expenses, but also 
living expenses of children for four years of college, 
and supplemental order of court provided sufficient 
additional payments for times when children were 
not employed and living at home during summer 
vacation months, failure to provide wife with 
additional child support to maintain a home for 
children even while they were away in college v/as 
not an error. C.R.S/63, 46-1-5(4) 
The protection of children is well documented in Utah law. Despain 
v. Despain 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1980). Divorce court sits as court in equity 
so far as child custody, support payments and the like are concerned. 
U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-5- Dehm v. Dehm 5545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976) Divorce 
courts are deemed to have broad equitable powers in safeguarding the 
interests and welfare of children and the decree and orders in a divorce 
proceeding are of a different and higher character than judgments in an 
action of law. Barrett v. Barrett 403 P.2d 649, 17 Utah 2d 1. (Utah 1965). 
Where grounds for divorce had been established and it plainly appeared 
that marriage had disintegrated to point where it would be folly to do 
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otherwise than to dissolve it, trial court had no other alternative than to 
grant a divorce and to make such arrangement with respect to children 
and property rights as might provide best possible foundation for future of 
parties. 
It is respectfully requested of this court to protect the rights of the 
children of this union, as fully as the law allows, and to give full 
consideration of who is responsible and how the children will be 
compensated for the lost back child support owed by their natural father; 
due to the agreement, with him, of the parties to this action. 
I l l : THE DENIAL OF ALIMONY TO PLAINTIFF WAS AN 
ERROR IN LAW, FACT #5, BUT RATHER DEFENDANT IS ABLE TO 
SUPPORT THE PLAINTIFF MORE IN THE MANNER THAT SHE WAS 
ACCUSTOMED TO DURING THE MARRIAGE AND THE COURT SHOULD 
SO ORDER. 
In making an award of alimony, trial courts in Utah are duty bound 
to consider the financial condition and needs of the spouse requesting 
alimony, the ability of that spouse to produce sufficient income for herself 
or himself and the ability of the paying spouse to provide support to the 
requesting spouse. (Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985); Newmeyer 
v. Newmever. 745 P.2d 276 (Utah 1987); Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 
(Utah 1985); Canning v. Canning. 744 P.2d 325 (Utah App. 1987); and 
Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989). 
Once the court has considered the evidence related to these criteria, 
it must then attempt to adjust the parties' finances to arrive at support 
figures which achieve as closely as possible an equalization of the 
standards of living of both parties and then as a secondary consideration, 
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attempt to maintain each of them at a level as close as possible to the 
standard of living they enjoyed while married. 
As was stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Olson v. Olson. 704 P.2d 
564 (Utah 1985): 
An alimony award should, as far as possible, equalize the 
parties1 respective standards of living and maintain them at a 
level as close as possible to the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage. 
The record is completely void of evidence showing the court's 
consideration of the factors articulated by the Utah Supreme Court and 
Utah Court of Appeals relating to alimony awards. 
The court has stated: 
An alimony award should, to the extent possible, equalize 
the parties' respective post divorce living standards and 
maintain them at a level as close as possible to that standard of 
living enjoyed during the marriage." Gardner v. Gardner 748 
P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988)x The Utah Supreme Court has 
articulated three factors that must be considered by the trial 
court in determining a reasonable alimony award: (1) The 
financial conditions and needs of the requesting spouse; (2) 
the ability of the requesting spouse to produce a sufficient 
income for himself of herself; and (3) the ability of the other 
spouse to provide support 
Failure to consider these factors constitutes an abuse of the 
trial court discretion. Paffel v. Paffel 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986). 
In the case of Rasband v. Rasband 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988), 
the court stated: 
The trial court made one vague, conclusive finding 
regarding Mrs. Rasband's present and future ability to produce 
a sufficient income to meet her needs . . . the Findings of Fact 
must show that the court's judgment or decree 'follows logically 
from and is supported by the evidence'." Smith v. Smith 726 
P.2d 423. 426 (Utahl986). The findings "should be sufficiently 
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detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue 
was reached". 
In the case of Fletcher v. Fletcher. 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980) the 
court stated: 
Function of alimony is to provide support for wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during 
marriage and prevent wife from becoming public charge; 
criteria in determining reasonable award of support include 
financial conditions and needs of wife, ability of wife to 
produce sufficient income for herself, and ability of husband to 
to provide support. English v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 
1977). The most important function of alimony is to provide 
support for the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of 
living she enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the wife 
from becoming a public charge. 
The trial court volunteered no information regarding Rita's present 
and future ability to produce a sufficient income to meet her and the 
children's needs above a poverty level even with the child support 
awarded. Section 30-4-1, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended 
codifies how this this need should be judged (A-61). 
The record shows that the parties have been married over eight (8) 
years, that Rita has no educational degree and that she had not worked 
outside her home since 1966. (p. par. 9 - Record on Appeal) 
Rita obtained a poverty level job in October 1989 at the Hilton Hotel 
as a hostess, (p. par. 11 - Record on Appeal). She used this income to 
support herself, and the children after James deserted and abandoned her 
and the children leaving the family destitute. She is no longer employed 
by the Hilton Hotel. 
By contrast, the record shows that James, on the other hand, was 
living on his U.P Corporation Pension Plan payment of Three Thousand 
39 
Ninety Five Dollars and 72 Cents ($3,095.72) a month; as he was now 
retired and — was living in his son's home (the son was not there but 
was paying rent). The rent was making the mortgage payments on the 
home and James was thus enjoying free housing, (p. 51. par. 8 - Record on 
Appeal). The rental agreement was and still is making the mortgage 
payments and James is still living there. 
The record shows no consideration of Rita's standard of living as set 
forth in the foregoing Utah cases. 
In the recent case of Naranjo v. Naranjo 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 
1988) the court stated: 
Failure to analyze the parties' circumstances in the light 
of these three factors constitutes an abuse of discretion . . ." 
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that, "it is unrealistic to 
assume that a woman in her mid-fifties with no substantial 
work experience or training will be able to enter the job 
market and support herself in anything even resembling the 
style in which the couple had been living." Jones v. Jones 700 
P.2d 1075 (Utah 1985) . . . where marriage is of long 
duration and earning capacity of one spouse greatly exceeds 
that of the other . . . it is appropriate to order alimony . . . at 
a level which will insure that the supported spouse . . . may 
maintain a standard of living not unduly disproportioned to 
that which [she] would have enjoyed had the marriage 
continued." Savage v. Savage 658 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1983). 
Therefore the only way to achieve an equitable allocation of income 
between the parties is to award alimony so that each party can at least 
have similar standards of living. Even in so doing, there will still be a 
disparity in disposable income, but under the circumstances of this case, 
perhaps such a disparity is unavoidable. 
As was stated in Gramme v. Gramme. 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978): 
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The purpose of alimony is to provide post marital 
support; it is intended neither as a penalty to be imposed on 
the husband nor as a reward granted to the wife. 
Finding of Fact #5 is not supported by evidence in the record and 
should be reversed as an error in law. 
IV: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DIVIDING ALL THE 
MUTUAL PROPERTY IN A MORE EQUITABLE MANNER, INCLUDING 
THE SECOND HOME WHICH WAS NOT SOLD., FACT #6, BUT RATHER 
THIS DIVISION SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED AND AN EQUITABLE 
AWARD.MADE TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
James testified as follows: 
Q. (By Mr. Richman) Mr. Gum, when you were married to 
your first wife did you purchase a home? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Where is that home? 
A. 635 H Street here in Salt Lake City. 
Q. And whose money did you use to purchase that home? 
A. My money. 
Q. And is that where the plaintiff is residing at the time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was the house remodeled after you married this present wife, 
Rita Gum? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. And whose money was used to remodel the house? 
A. My money. 
Q. Was it from your earnings at work? 
A. Earnings, my earnings. 
Q. And savings? 
A. And savings. 
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Q. And was there any money at the time provided to you by Rita 
Gum, the plaintiff in this action, to remodel or purchase anything toward 
the upkeep of this house? 
A. None whatsoever. (Tr. p. 3, line 24 to p. 4, line 24 & A-50 & A-
51). 
There were three mortgages, taken in the names of the parties for 
funds to do the remodeling, causing the property to be held jointly. 
Proffer by Mr, Spafford as follows: 
Mr. Spafford: Let me make a proffer, your honor, to save a 
lot of time. 
My proffer is that she earns less than $600 a month; he earns 
$3,000 month. This couple has two homes. The one is the exhibit 9-P, 
which is the home they're living in. It is owned jointly by them, and while 
admittedly it was acquired prior to the marriage, during the marriage from 
marital assets the home was remodeled. Indeed it was conveyed to her 
jointly with him, so she's has an equitable interest in the property, (A-30). 
They have a second piece of property in Salt Lake County, the 
lot 72, Whitewood Estates, another home which is also deeded to the two 
parties jointly, Mr. Gum has placed, under a rental agreement, his son in 
the second piece property, and he is collecting the rent on it, (A-31). 
So effectively, your order dispossesses her of the home she's 
living in and effectively grants him the possession of both pieces of 
property, two homes [Emphasis added] 
So we have the ludicrous situation of a woman who earns a 
poverty level wage, who has no place to go. and who has a equity in two 
separate pieces of property: and the husband winds up with both pieces of 
property while she's effectively pwt out on the street (Tr. p. 20 & A-52). 
[Emphasis added] 
In re Marriage of Kittleson 585 P.2d 167, 21 Wash.App. 344 
(Wash.App. 1978). the court stated: 
In marriage dissolution action, it is trial court's duty to 
characterize property of parties as community or separate, and 
to dispose of all property of parties which is brought to its 
attention. 
In another Washington case Lynn v. Lynn 480 P.2d 789, 4 Wash.App. 
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171 (Wash.App. 1971) the court stated: 
Although trial court is not in a divorce proceeding 
required to award all separate property to the party acquiring 
it or to divide community property equally, the court does not 
have unfetted freedom to exercise its personal judgment. 
RCWA 26.08-110. 
Disposition of property is cited in Section 30-3-5, Utah Code 
Annotated. 1953, as amended (A-59). 
In a Wyoming case Kane v. Kane 577 P.2d 172 (Wyo. 1978) the court 
stated: 
In a divorce proceeding the disposition of property of the 
parties is an equitable function of the court. 
Both homes of the parties were held in joint tenancy. In the Arizona 
case of Nesmith v. Nesmith 540 P.2d 1229, 112 Ariz. 248 (Ariz. 195). it is 
stated: 
Joint tenancy property is to be divided equally by trial 
court in divorce. A.R.S. § 25-318. 
In making a division of marital property in a divorce proceeding, the 
trial Court is governed by general principles of equity. Title 30 Chapter 3, 
Section 5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Land v. Land. 605 P.2d 
1248. 
This writer submits that there is no semblance of equity in awarding 
of the other home to the Respondent with no part of that asset to the 
Appellant. 
V: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO TAKE 
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND SHOULD HAVE 
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AWARDED PLAINTIFF HER COSTS AND FEES FOR HAVING TO TAKE 
THIS ACTION. FACT #9. 
Section 30-3-3 Utah Code Annotated. (1984) provides that a trial 
court may award attorney fees and costs in a divorce action. Rita C. Gum 
was financially unable to pay the fees and costs. Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d 
417, 419 (Utah 1986). 
This Court in the recent case of Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 
(Utah App. 1988) found that under the Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-
3 that on remand the Trial Court should also determine the Appellant's 
need for Respondent's payment of her attorney's fees incurred in the 
appeal and that if a financial need were adequately shown that the Trial 
Court could take evidence regarding a reasonable fee in making such an 
order pursuant to that statute. 
Under Utah code Annotated Section 30-3-3 and Heltman v. Heltman. 
511 P.2d 720 (Utah 1973) this Court should consider this appeal and so 
order. 
In the case of Fite v. Fite 479 P. 2d 560, 3 Wash.App. 726 (Wash.App. 
1970)x the court stated: 
Where wife had, when divorce action was commenced, no 
assets on which to draw for payment of attorney's fees and 
costs, fact that she would receive assets when litigation was 
finally terminated was not test of whether attorney's fees 
should be allowed, and award to wife of $10,000 for attorney's 
fees for services rendered in unraveling and establishing 
community interest in over 10 years of transactions, both 
inside and outside husband's business pursuit, and $1,800 for 
costs with which to pay wife's accountant was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
Defendant should be ordered to pay plaintiffs attorneys' fees for 
being forced to file this action, (p. 4 par. 15 - Record on Appeal). 
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Rita C. Gum respectfully submits that where she has a continuing 
need and James Richard Gum's income far exceeds her own, she should also 
be awarded a reasonable attorney fee and costs incurred in the Trial Court 
as well as in the bringing of this appeal. 
VI: THE DENIAL OF THE PLAINTIFF'S INTEREST IN AND 
ENTITLEMENT PERTAINING TO DEFENDANT'S BENEFIT PLANS, 
RETIREMENT PLANS, THRIFT PLANS, SAVINGS, STOCK PLANS OR 
OTHER BENEFIT PLAN WHATSOEVER WAS AN ERROR IN LAW, 
FACT #12, AND SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED WITH AN EQUITABLE 
AWARD MADE TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
A pension being considered as marital property (Woodward v. 
Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), a portion of Respondent's monthly 
pension benefits should be considered as an entitlement of Appellant. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the oft cited case of Woodward v. 
Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), specifically held, citing an earlier 
case of Englert v. Englert. 576 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1978) as follows: 
. . . We emphasize the equitable nature of proceedings dealing 
with the family, pointing out that the court may take into 
consideration all of the pertinent circumstances. These 
circumstances encompass "all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from 
whatever source derived; and that this includes any such 
pension fund or insurance". Id, at 1276. To the extent that 
Bennett v. Bennett, supra, may limit the ability of the court to 
consider all of the parties' assets and circumstances, including 
retirement and pension rights, it is expressly overruled. 
t In the immediate case at hand, the Appellant based on the transcript 
as -resistea by the ^ ^ n d e n t , did specifically ask for a division of the 
retirement he was currently receiving as a part of property distribution. A 
review of the Memorandum Decision and the Findings of Fact, (A-ll). fails 
to disclose any consideration by the Trial Court of the retirement benefits 
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or a consideration of a division of that property as a marital asset accrued 
during the parties marriage of 8 years. The Court did find the income of 
the Defendant/Respondent including his retirement to be $259,132 and did 
not address the retirement as income to the Plaintiff, and failed to make 
any distribution of that retirement as a marital asset or marital property 
in the distribution thereof. The retirement accumulated should be treated 
as a marital asset and as personal property to be considered by the Court 
in the division of the property. 
Based upon the above and foregoing points of law, the fact that the 
retirement is a marital asset and should be distributed equitably and the 
Trial Court's failure to delineate through its findings of fact as required by 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the Court's treatment of that 
marital asset, the findings should be better delineated by this court. 
VII: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PLACING UNDUE EMPHASIS 
ON THE QUICK SALE OF ONE OF THE COUPLEfS HOMES AND NOT 
THE OTHER AND THERE WAS AN ERROR IN LAW IN ORDERING 
PLAINTIFF TO MOVE FROM HER HOME, FORCING ITS QUICK SALE 
AT AN UNREASONABLY LOW PRICE, AND IT SHOULD BE SO NOTED 
IN THE RECORD. 
The trial court became angry when Rita was unable to move from 
her home as quickly as he desired: 
The Court: If you follow the rules of proper practice- and as I 
say again, I'm not trying the attorneys here today, but Fm going to order 
that she vacate it within ten days, and if she doesn't vacate within 10 days, 
then the court will cite her for contempt. [Emphasis added] 
And that doesn't mean Mr. Gum is going to take it over and live 
in it. That house has got to be sold immediately. If it hasn't sold, the price 
is too high. Something is the matter. So He's not going to take it and be in 
the same position that she is, to live in the house and not get it sold. The 
house is going to be sold. (Tr p. 42, lines 4-17 & A-55). [Emphasis added]. 
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But she has ten days to get moved, and you have ten days to 
get the house in shape so it can be sold. (Tr. p. 42, lines 22 - 24 & A-55). 
And if you need more than ten days to get it in condition, fine. 
But there is no need to be moving into it because you're going to be out of 
it shortly thereafter. (Tr. p. 44, lines 5-8 & A-56). 
He can take possession and get it ready to be sold. I'm not 
going to allow him to move into the premises, so, this house will be sold. 
He may have to rent a place, but he's not going to be moving in. 
She's going to be moving out. We'll get it sold and I think that 
will resolve this case in a hurry. (Tr.. p. 45, lines 10 - 16) 
Mr. Spafford: So effectively, your order dispossesses her of the 
home she's living in and effectively grants him the possession of both 
pieces of property, two homes. ( Tr. p. 21, lines 13 - 15 & A-53). 
The Case had degenerated into a case of selling the Salt Lake City 
home on 655 H Street, (A-30), fast; at a "Fire Sale" for any price, at that. 
Just get the house sold. But nothing was said of selling the other home at 
5685 South 3650 West, Bennion; (A-31), where James was living on his U.P 
Corporation Pension Plan payment of Three Thousand Ninety Five Dollars 
and 72 Cents ($3,095.72) a month; as he was now retired. 
Rita sold the home alright, for One Hundred and Eighteen Thousand 
Dollars ($118,000). She had two appraisals of over Two Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($200,000) each. But, with pressure from the Court she could not 
wait longer for the right buyer., a potential loss of over Eighty Thousand 
Dollars ($80,000). 
The court ordered appellant to move in the unreasonable time of ten 
days and finally presented an unfair dilemma to the appellant, either 
move or else 
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VIII: THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL JUDGE CONSTITUTES 
JUDICIAL BIAS. 
The transcript begins: 
Salt Lake City, Utah; Wednesday, July 11, 1990 (3:00 P.M.) 
The Court: Do yow think we are going to finish this by five 
o'clock? (Tr.. p. 1, lines 20 - 21). [Emphasis added]. 
Mr. Richman: Oh, sure. 
Q (By Mr. Spafford) Let me put it this way. Where would 
you go if you moved out? 
A. I don't have anyplace to go. [Emphasis added]. 
The Court: That's immaterial. [Emphasis added]. 
Mr. Spafford: It goes to the issue of contempt, your Honor. 
The court: Let's find out why she doesn't move out, not where 
she's going to go. [Emphasis added]. 
Q (By Mr. Spafford) Why haven't you moved out? 
A. I don't have anyplace to go. I don't have anv money to go 
anyplace. (Tr. p. 20, lines 2 -13 & A-52). [Emphasis added]. 
The Court: We're going to waste a lot of time here. I can sort it 
out. I told vou in the first instance I'm inclined to have her move out of 
the house: They haven't shown me any reason why she shouldn't be out. 
So, I'm not convinced that the fact that she hasn't any place to go is any 
reason that I should not enforce the order. So, you know— (Tr. p. 25, lines 
16 -22 & A-54). [Emphasis added]. 
Had the court not decided the issue before hearing the testimony, 
and was not willing to take the time to hear the testimony? Can a court 
make an unbiased and unprejudiced decision without weighing the 
testimony of moving a person out of their home against their rights under 
the 14th Amendment of Section 1 of the United States Constitution? 
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In a similar case, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
We offer the general philosophy expressed in Haslam v. 
Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520. 523 (1948) Justice 
Wolfe, writing for the court, stated: The purity and integrity of 
the judicial process ought to be protected against any taint of 
suspicion to the end that the public and litigants may have the 
highest confidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts.1 
Justice Wade in a concurring opinion stressed this point when 
he wrote: 'One of the most important things in government is 
that all persons subject to its jurisdiction shall always be able 
to maintain a fair and impartial trial in all matters of litigation 
in the courts. It is nearly as important that the people have 
absolute confidence in the integrity of the courts. I can think 
of nothing that would as surely bring the courts into disrepute 
as for a judge to insist on trying a case when one of the 
litigants believes that such judge is biased and prejudiced 
against him'." Marchant v. Marchant 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 
1987), 
It is respectfully urged that the foregoing conduct constitutes judicial 
bias and an error in law and should not be condoned by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in awarding a mutual Decree of Divorce, (A-22). 
By not awarding Rita permanent alimony the trial court erroneously 
failed to maintain the wife's standard of living at least to the level of when 
the parties were living on a retirement income, and also there is a great 
disparity between the parties in terms of education and earning capacity. 
In addition, the trial court's Findings were fatally defective in that 
they did not address the wife's ability to support herself or contain the 
necessary financial facts to support the no alimony award. Alimony should 
be awarded to Rita. 
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The child support should be modifyed as the law allows and a 
reasonable amount of child support be allotted to maintain the children's 
standard of living, 
Rita should be awarded a fair and equitable division of marital 
property. 
In not making an award of attorney's fees, the trial court failed to 
consider the ability of Rita to pay those fees. Rita's disposable income is 
far less than James' as well as being less stable. In addition, she was 
awarded no property to which she could look to satisfy the fee. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, (A-ll), and Decree of 
Divorce, (A-22), should be modified to be consistent with the evidence and 
the law. 
Appellant would respectfully request that the relief requested as set 
forth in RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL, P. 20, be granted and that she be 
awarded her Attorney fees and expenses incurred in connection with the 
court trial and this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of February, 1991. 
yfyjg> d. \A^y 
Rita C. Gum 
In propria persona 
Plaintiff- Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
RITA B. GUM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES RICHARD GUM, 
Defendant. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. ^0^90/0(0% 
Honorable ^ d ^ J ^ * &>h 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW plaintiff, and for cause of action allege the 
following: 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah and has so resided for three months prior to the 
commencement of this action• 
2. The parties were married in salt Lake County, State 
of Utah on March 24, 1982. 
3. Plaintiff is the mother of two minor children who 
were adopted by defendant and are considered to be issue of the 
marital relationship. 
to wit: Amy Charmaine Gum (DOB 3/14/75) and Joy Charmaine Gum 
(DOB 9/22/76) 
4. The parties have been unable to settle the marital 
differences resulting in the termination of the marriage due to 
irreconcilable differences, 
5. Plaintiff is a fit and proper parent who should be -, 
awarded the care, custody and control of the minor children 
subject to defendant's reasonable visitation. 
6. Defendant should be ordered to pay child support 
payments to plaintiff in an amount computed from the Child 
Support Guidelines on the worksheet attached hereto. 
7. The parties have acquired a home which should be sold 
and the net proceeds divided equally. 
8. During the marriage relationship, the parties have 
acquired investments which should be equitably divided. 
9. Plaintiff is entitled to retirement income from 
defendant's employment when she is age 60, said retirement should 
be ordered by the Court. 
10. The parties have acquired various items of personal 
property which should be equitably divided. 
11. All marital debts prior to separation should be 
assumed and paid by defendant. 
12. Plaintiff should pay for her vehicle and bank card. 
13. Defendant should maintain all health, accident and 
life insurance policies preserving the currently named 
beneficiaries until the youngest child reaches age 18. 
14. Defendant should continue to pay all health 
insurance premiums for the minor children and all uninsured 
medical, dental and optometric expenses of the minor children 
should be split equally by the parties. 
15. Defendant should be ordered to pay plaintiff's 
attorneys' fees for being forced to file this action. 
16. Alimony of $1.00 per year should be awarded to 
plaintiff. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff should be awarded a decree of 
divorce from defendant on the following terms and conditions: 
1. Plaintiff should be awarded custody and child support 
of the minor child subject to reasonable visitation with 
defendant. 
2. The parties' home should be sold and the net proceeds 
should be split equally. 
4. Defendant should assume all marital debts except for 
plaintiff's vehicle and bankcard. 
5. Defendant should maintain all insurance policies with 
the same beneficiaries until the youngest child is age 18; he 
should also provide health insurance coverage for the minor 
children and all uninsured medical, dental and optometric 
expenses of the minor children shall be split equally by the 
parties. 
6. Defendant should pay plaintiff's attorneys' fees for 
having to prosecute this action. 
7. Alimony of $1.00 per year should be awarded to 
plaintiff. 
Dated this 9 day of 'T??asu^^ 1990. 
/SJ2^S ^ 7 / / > I ^ ^ 
/?-j 
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this £ day of 
1990. 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
Commission Expires 
3/28/92 
H. Delbert Welker 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Glen M. Richman, (2752) 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-8844 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RITA B. GUM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JAMES RICHARD GUM, 
Defendant. 
TRIAL BRIEF 
Civil No. D90-4901065 
Judge John A. Rokich 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
1. Defendant, James R. Gum purchased a home in 1970 with 
his first wife who passed away during their marriage, making him 
a widower (that marriage lasted in excess of twenty seven (27) 
years. The marriage to plaintiff is a second marriage for 
defendant. The marriage having occurred on March 24, 1982. 
Subsequent to that marriage, the parties have had a very stormy 
relationship; have been separated numerous times and have filed 
three separate divorce actions against one another, and one case 
was amended. The cases were filed March 26, 1987. There was an 
amended complaint October 12, 1988. Another complaint on the 
31st of October, 1988 and the current action was filed by 
plaintiff on the 8th day of March, 1990. 
2. The parties have not lived together since the filing of 
the last complaint. 
3. The defendant has been represented by Debbie Hann, Del 
Welker, James Medlin and Earl Spafford and now represents herself 
after Mr. Spafford's late withdrawal. A Notice to Appoint 
Successor Counsel occurred on the 31st day of July, 1990. 
4. This present marriage is a third marriage for the 
plaintiff, Rita B. Gum. Both of her former marriages ended in 
divorce. 
5. Plaintiff has four (4) children by one of her former 
marriages, which were adopted by defendant. Two of said adopted 
children are minors; Amy, born March 14, 1975, age 15 1/2 years, 
and Joy, born September 22, 1976, age 14 years. 
6. The Court issued an order and reaffirmed the order 
requiring plaintiff to vacate defendant's home on or before the 
20th day of May, 1990. Plaintiff ignored that court order. 
During an Order to Show Cause and Motion for Management and 
Scheduling Conference, the Court reaffirmed that the plaintiff 
should be removed from the home within ten (10) days. Plaintiff 
ignored that order. 
7. The home has now been sold and the net proceeds are 
available for a determination by the Court as to division, if 
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any . 
8. Defendant is retired, has had open heart surgery in 
1987; is a serious diabetic and must receive insulin. 
9. Plaintiff is employed and is also a diabetic. 
10. Plaintiff placed her physical and mental condition in 
issue during her deposition on the 25th day of May, 1990. A 
subpoena was issued for a records deposition for two of her 
doctors. Plaintiff, through her then counsel obtained an ex 
parte protective order quashing the deposition notices and 
requiring the expense of obtaining them at a later date. 
11. There are Interrogatories that were forwarded to 
plaintiff prior to the withdrawal of her counsel, Earl Spafford. 
Said Interrogatories bear the date of the 10th of July, 1990 and 
plaintiff has made no response. 
12. Defendant made a Request for Production of Documents on 
the 10th day of July, 1990 while plaintiff was represented by 
counsel and there has been no production whatsoever . 
13. Defendant made certain Demands for Admissions of Fact 
on July 10, 1990, while plaintiff was represented by counsel, and 
there has been no response. 
14. When plaintiff vacated the home and the home was sold 
during the month of August, 1990, she removed from the home most 
all of the parties' personal property items which were located 
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therein, including the defendant's premarital items. Annexed 
hereto as Exhibit A to this Trial Brief is a copy of the items 
taken from the home with an identification of those items left in 
the home, and with defendant's estimated fair market value of 
said items. 
ISSUES JTO. BE..RESOLVED 
1. Custody is not an issue. The parties have agreed that 
the children may reside with whichever party they desire 
(apparently the children desire to live with the plaintiff). 
2. The defendant is willing to pay child support in 
accordance with the Uniform Child Support Guidelines. Defendant 
is also willing to provide hospital and medical insurance through 
his former employer for the benefit of said children during their 
minority to age 18 years. 
3. The defendant is willing to divide equally any 
retirement earned during the parties' marriage or accruing during 
the parties* marriage. 
4. With respect to the house equity, it is defendant's 
position that the house was his prior to marriage and all the 
remodeling came from his premarital savings; that the payments on 
the mortgage reducing the mortgage during the marriage came from 
his earnings or retirement benefits since retirement. It is 
defendant's position that he should be awarded all right, title 
and interest in an to all of the proceeds from the sale of said 
home which was ordered sold by the Court. 
5. The personal property which was removed by the 
plaintiff at the time she vacated the house should be divided 
equitably or the values equitably between the parties. 
6. There should be no alimony. 
7. Each party should pay their separate costs and fees. 
8. As appropriate, a withhold and deliver order should be 
entered, if applicable where defendant is retired. 
9. The Court should review the matter of plaintiff's 
intent in refusing to obey lawful court orders and requiring 
added expense in court appearances in this action. 
DATED this (o day of September, 1990. 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
•GLEN M. RICHMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
GLEN M. RICHMAN hereby certifies that he delivered a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Trial Brief to plaintiff, Rita 
B. Gum, by personally delivering the same to her this 6th day of 
September, 1990. 
DATED this fc? day of September, 1990. 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
GLEN M. RICHMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Glen M. Richman, (2752) 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-8844 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RITA B. GUM, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. D90-4901065 
JAMES RICHARD GUM, ) Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendant. ) 
The above matter came for trial before the Honorable Judge 
John A. Rokich in his courtroom on the 6th day of September, 
1990. Plaintiff appearing in person pro se, her previous 
attorney having withdrawn effective the 30th day of July, 1990; 
Notice to Appoint Successor Counsel having been made on the 31st 
day of July, 1990, and the plaintiff having made it known to the 
Court by filing a pro se pleading that she desired to pursue her 
matter without other counsel. The defendant appeared in person 
and through his attorney, Glen M. Richman. Extensive discussion 
occurred between the Court and the plaintiff and defendant's 
counsel, and certain agreements were made and stipulated into the 
record pertaining to all issues in this action and the defendant 
was sworn and gave testimony in support of his cause and to 
establish jurisdiction, residency, and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises now makes and enters its 
FINDINGS „0F FACT 
1 . Each of the parties are actual and bona fide residents 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and were for more than three 
months immediately preceding the commencement of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant are wife and husband, having 
married in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 24th day of 
March, 1982. 
3. There are no children born as issue of the marriage. 
Four children of plaintiff by a previous marriage were adopted by 
defendant. Two of said children are minors; namely Amy C. Gum, 
born March 14, 1975 and Joy C. Gum, born September 22, 1976. 
4. During the marriage, irreconcilable differences have 
arisen causing the parties to grow apart and make the marriage 
unworkable and irreconcilable through their quarrelling and 
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disagreements. 
5. Defendant was a widower prior to his marriage to 
plaintiff and had certain premarital property, including a home 
located at 655 H Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Said home was 
remodeled subsequent to the marriage and a mortgage was taken 
thereon in addition to payment of some of the remodeling costs 
from defendant's premarital savings. The home was sold in 
August, 1990 and after selling costs, produced an approximate net 
equity of $10,000.00. 
6. The parties have each expressed a desire to allow the 
minor children to be in the general care, custody and control of 
whichever party they desired and under present circumstances the 
children have selected the plaintiff. 
7. The defendant is retired from the Union Pacific 
Railroad; had heart surgery in 1987 and is a serious diabetic and 
must take insulin. He has pension and retirement programs from 
his former employer, and his income from those sources is 
$3,095.72. Defendant is 59 years of age, his birthday being the 
fifth day of January, 1931. 
8. The plaintiff is 53 years of age, having been born on 
the 20th day of January, 1937. She is employed at the Hilton 
Hotel and earns on the average of $563.60 (computed from gross 
earnings of $4,422.10 through the pay period August 26, 1990, or 
thirty four (34) weeks, averaging $130.06 per week, 52 weeks 
equals annual earnings of $6,763.21, or $563.60 per month.) 
9. The parties' combined monthly income is $3,659.00; the 
Uniform Child Support Schedules for two children provide for 
$653.00. Defendant's income is 85% of said figure and 
plaintiff's is 15%. Defendant should pay to the plaintiff the 
sum of $555.00 per month, or $277.00 per month per child for each 
of the minor children during their minority to age eighteen (18) 
years, or until earlier emancipation. 
10. Defendant has hospital and medical insurance available 
through his former employer for the benefit of the minor 
children. 
11. The parties have divided certain items of property and 
agreed before the Court on the record, to the return of certain 
items by plaintiff to the defendant on or before entry of the 
Decree on the 10th day of September, 1990, including the Llardro 
and porcelain having a value of $600.00; defendant's oriental 
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sword having a value of $150.00; his 30-06 hunting rifle having a 
value of $350.00 and his binoculars having a value of $75-00. 
The balance of the personal property as presently divided shall 
remain with the parties as divided and shall be their separate 
property. The plaintiff having in her possession the king size 
bed, two night stands, two bed lamps, a table lamp, a swag light, 
a dresser with mirror, a lamp table, a swivel rocker, a lounge, a 
vanity, a vanity chair, two dresser lamps, two vanity lamps, a 
Panasonic TV, a TV stand, three wall pictures, two night stand 
mirrors, a bedspread, a twin bed, a dresser with mirror, an 
additional night stand with bed lamp, dresser lamp, a vanity from 
the front bedroom and a vanity bench, a baby grand piano, a Sanyo 
TV, a gold curio cabinet, two plant stands, a dining room table, 
china cabinet, three chairs, coffee maker, a toaster, three fry 
pans, dishes, silverware, pots, pans, cooking utensils, 
cuisineart; from the downstairs bedroom, a twin bed, a desk with 
bookshelf, night stand, dresser with mirror , lingerie dresser, 
hope chest, desk chair, three pictures, bed lamp, two dresser 
lamps; from the family room a sofa, love seat, entertainment 
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center, VCR, computer, printer and table, coffee table, glass top 
table, Zenith TV, oil; from the utility room, the washer and 
dryer; from miscellaneous items, the vacuum cleaner, a hand 
vacuum cleaner, an upright piano, a telephone answering machine, 
a sewing machine, rowing machine, garden hose. 
12. The defendant has in his possession a clock radio, a 
swag light, a recliner; from the living room, a sofa, swivel 
rocker, two end tables, coffee table, a stereo, two table lamps; 
from the dining room, six dining room chairs; from the kitchen, 
dishes, silverware, pots and pans, Farberware, an oak table; from 
the family room, an oil still life, a desk and desk chair, a wall 
clock, a cuckoo clock, a mantle clock and a desk lamp; from the 
utility room a file cabinet; from miscellaneous items, the lawn 
mower, garden tools, carpenter tools, fishing gear, golf 
equipment, ladder, barbecue and patio furniture. 
13. The parties have agreed to share copies of a picture 
album. 
14. The parties agreed that the plaintiff would be paid the 
sum of Three Thousand Dollars from the proceeds of the sale of 
the home upon the date of entry of the Decree provided the 
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plaintiff has returned the Llardro, the hunting rifle, the sword 
and the binoculars; and that except for the personal items of 
property identified which have been divided between the parties, 
all other property of the defendant would remain as his sole and 
separate property, including his pension, savings, and benefit 
plans and all personal property in his possession. 
15. The parties agreed that no alimony would be awarded to 
either party. 
16. The parties agreed that the support for the minor 
children would be in accordance with the Uniform Child Support 
Schedules and that there is no reason for the Court to deviate 
therefrom . 
17. The parties agreed that each would pay for their 
respective attorney's fees and costs. 
18. The parties agreed that the defendant would be awarded 
the minor children as dependents for income tax purposes during 
the taxable year 1990 and each taxable year thereafter provided 
he is current on his child support obligation at the end of the 
calendar year and provided further that at such time as the 
plaintiff's earnings are sufficient that she could receive a 
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benefit from claiming one of the children as a dependent, that 
she should be entitled to claim the oldest of the minor children 
as a dependent for income tax purposes during that year and each 
succeeding year when it would be a benefit to her from a tax 
saving. The plaintiff should be required to execute and deliver 
any Internal Revenue Service form required to allow the defendant 
to claim the children as dependents for tax purposes, both 
federal and state. 
19. It was agreed that the child support for the minor 
children be paid to the plaintiff by the defendant in one lump 
sum each month on or before the 5th day of each month. 
20. The parties agreed that each should pay their separate 
debts and obligations incurred subsequent to the date of their 
separation on March 8, 1990, that each party is required to pay 
their separate obligation for their respective automobiles, and 
that each would hold the other harmless from any liability 
thereon, and that defendant would pay the debts and obligations 
incurred during the course of the marriage up to the date of the 
parties ' separation. 
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From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes its 
CONCLUSIONS OF„LAW 
1. Defendant is entitled and should be awarded a Decree of 
Divorce upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same 
to become final upon entry. 
2. The general care, custody and control of the minor 
children at present should be awarded to the plaintiff subject to 
reasonable rights of visitation in the defendant at all 
reasonable times and places. 
3. The personal property of the parties should remain as 
presently divided with the exception of the 30-06 hunting rifle, 
the binoculars, the oriental sword and the Llardro in plaintiff's 
possession which should be returned to the defendant on or before 
the date of the entry of the Decree, September 10, 1990. 
4. The plaintiff should be awarded the sum of Three 
Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) representing her interest in the 
proceeds from the sale of the parties' home, subject to her 
return of the sword, rifle, binoculars and Llardro. 
5. All other property not previously divided shall remain 
the sole and separate property of the defendant, including his 
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pension, savings, thrift and/or other benefit plans with his 
former employer; his savings and any premarital property 
presently in his possession. 
6. The support for the minor children should be paid by 
the defendant to plaintiff in one lump sum each month on or 
before the 5th day of the month, beginning with the month of 
September, in the sum of Two Hundred Seventy Seven ($277.00) per 
child, per month. Said support shall continue during the 
minority of each child to age eighteen (18) years. 
7. Neither party should be awarded alimony. 
8. Each party should pay their separate debts and 
obligations incurred subsequent to the parties' separation March 
8, 1990, and each shall hold the other harmless from any 
liability thereon. Each party is required to pay their separate 
obligation for their respective automobile. The defendant should 
assume and discharge the marital debts and obligations incurred 
prior to the parties' separation on March 8, 1990, and should be 
required to hold the plaintiff harmless from any liability 
thereon . 
9. Each party should pay their separate costs and fees. 
10 
10. The defendant should be allowed to claim the children 
as dependents for income tax purposes during the taxable year 
19^0 and each taxable year thereafter during their minority, 
provided he is current at the end of the calendar year on his 
child support obligation, and provided further, that in the event 
there is a benefit by tax saving to the plaintiff from her 
increased earnings in the future, then in that year and each year 
in which she would receive a tax savings and benefit by claiming 
one of the children, then she should be allowed to claim the 
oldest of the minor children as a dependent for that particular 
tax year 
11. The defendant should be required to maintain hospital 
and medical insurance for the benefit of the minor children so 
long as the same is available to him through his former employer. 
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 
DATED this day of September, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
JOHN A ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
11 
/}-Zl 
£y. 
Glen M. Richman, (2752) 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-8844 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
6cP 10 
Leputy Clerk 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE O^ UTAH 
RITA &. GUM, 
Plaintiff , 
vs . 
JAMES RICHARD GUM, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D90-4901065 
Judge John A. Rokich 
THE ABOVE MATTER came on for hearing before the Court, the 
Honorable Judge John A. Rokich in his courtroom on the 6th day of 
September, 1990. Plaintiff appearing in person pro se, defendant 
appearing in person and through counsel, Glen M. Richman. The 
Court having had extensive discussions with the plaintiff and 
with defendant through his counsel, and the parties having 
entered into a stipulation on the record, the same having been 
read into the record and having been affirmed by the parties and 
the Court being advised in the premises and having heretofore 
S) As*-* 
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows-" p^W^/J?*- ^^ 'A<e-
Defendant 4&- hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce upon 
the grounds of irreconcilable differences, to be final upon 
entry. 
2. The plaintiff is awarded presently the general care, 
custody and control of the minor children subject to reasonable 
and liberal rights of visitation in the defendant at all 
reasonable times and places. 
3. The defendant is ordered to pay child support 
consistent with the Uniform Child Support Guidelines in the sum 
of Two Hundred Seventy Seven ($277.00) per month per child during 
the minority of each child to age eighteen (18) years, or their 
earlier emancipation; the same to be paid in one payment per 
month on or before the 5th of each month, beginning with the 
month of September, 1990. 
4. The defendant is ordered to maintain hospital and 
medical insurance through his former employer for the benefit of 
the minor children during the minority of each. 
Zl <n •* 
5. Neither party is awarded alimony. 
6. The plaintiff is awarded the sum of Three Thousand 
Dollars ($3,000.00), representing her interest in the proceeds 
from the sale of the home. The Three Thousand Dollars 
($3,000.00) is to be paid to her on or before the 10th of 
September , 1990 provided the Decree is entered on said day and 
provided further that she has returned the oriental sword, the 
30-06 hunting rifle, the binoculars and Llardro to the defendant. 
7. With the exception of the Llardro, binoculars, the 30-
06 and oriental sword, the personal property of the parties shall 
remain as presently divided and as indicated specifically in the 
Findings of Fact. The four items mentioned herein shall be 
returned by the plaintiff to the defendant on or before the 10th 
day of September, 1990. Upon the return of said items, the Three 
Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) as above indicated shall be released 
to her. 
8. The defendant is ordered to assume and discharge the 
marital debts of the parties incurred prior to the parties' 
separation March 8, 1990. However, each party is required to pay 
their separate obligation for their respective automobile. Each 
3
 4-2«t 
of the parties is ordered to assume and discharge their separate 
debts and obligations incurred by each subsequent to the 
separation date of March 8, 1990, Each is required to hold the 
other harmless from any liability on the debts each is ordered to 
assume and discharge. 
9. Each party shall pay their separate costs and fees. 
10. The defendant shall be allowed to claim the minor 
children as dependents for income tax purposes during the taxable 
year 1990 and each taxable year thereafter during the children's 
minority provided he is current on his child support obligation 
at the end of the calendar year , and provided further that the 
plaintiff's earnings are insufficient to allow a benefit to her 
by claiming one of the minor children as a tax dependent. In the 
event in the future plaintiff's earnings are sufficient that she 
may benefit by a tax saving by claiming one of the children as a 
dependent for income tax purposes, then she may be allowed to 
claim the oldest of the two minor children during that particular 
year and each year in which that event is applicable. The 
plaintiff is required to execute and deliver to the defendant any 
and all IRS and tax forms necessary for him to claim the minor 
4 
children as dependents for income tax purposes. 
11. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver any and 
all documents necessary to accomplish the purposes and work the 
intent of the Court's Decree. 
12. The defendant is awarded as his sole and separate 
property, free from any claim or interest in the plaintiff, all 
right, interest and entitlement pertaining to his benefit plans 
through his former employment, including retirement plans, thrift 
plans, savings, stock plans or any benefit plan whatsoever. 
DATED this /& day of September, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
5 
A- -?£ 
OCT 4 i OS PH •SO 
RITA C. GUM 
Plaintiff and Appellant Thi;* -_ -!^lolCT 
1034 East 900 South bAL' • - -U-HTY 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 BY
 p K 
Telephone: (801) 532-1291 * ' if '~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
RITA C. GUM 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs . 
JAMES RICHARD GUM 
Defendant and Appellee. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. D90-4901065 
Judge John A. Rokich 
•oooOooo-
1. Notice is hereby given that plaintiff and appellant Rita 
C. Gum, representing herself, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals 
the final Decree of Divorce of the Honorable John A. Rokich 
entered in this matter on the 6th day of September, 1990. 
2. The appeal is taken from the following numbered 
paragraphs of the Decree of Divorce: 
Paragraph 1. Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby 
awarded a mutual Decree of Divorce upon the grounds of 
irreconcilable differences, to be final upon entry. 
Paragraph 3. The defendant is ordered to pay child 
support consistent with the Uniform Child Support 
Guidelines in the sum of Two Hundred Seventy Seven 
($277.00) per month per child during the minority of 
A-zi 
each child to the age of eighteen (18) years, or their 
earlier emancipation; the same to be paid in one payment 
per month on or before the 5th of each month, beginning 
with the month of September, 1990. 
Paragraph 5. Neither party is awarded alimony. 
Paragraph 6. The plaintiff is awarded the sum of 
Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000), representing her 
interest in the proceeds from the sale of the home. The 
Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000) is to be paid to her on 
or before the 10th of September, 1990 provided the 
Decree is entered on said day and provided further that 
she has returned the oriental sword, the 30-06 hunting 
rifle, the binoculars and Llardro to the defendant. 
Paragraph 7. With the exception of the Llardro, 
binoculars, the 30-06 and the oriental sword, the 
personal property of the parties shall remain as 
presently divided and as indicated specifically in the 
Findings of Fact. The four items mentioned herein shall 
be returned by the plaintiff to the defendant on or 
before the 10th day of September, 1990. Upon the return 
of said items, the Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000) as 
above indicated shall be released to her. 
Paragraph 9. Each party shall pay their separate 
costs and fees. 
Paragraph 12. The defendant is awarded as his sole 
and separate property, free from any claim or interest 
in the plaintiff, all right, interest and entitlement 
pertaining to his benefit plans through his former 
employment, including retirement plans, thrift plans, 
savings, stock plans or any benefit plan whatsoever. 
DATED this AQ Z ^ day of (L ('Jt'CU'U'^' , 1990. 
/ . ''SI L 
RITA C. GUM 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, certify the forgoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was served on the 
Defendant and Appellee this U?L day of October, 1990, by a true 
and correct copy thereof via United States Mail with postage 
prepaid thereon to James Richard Gum, 5685 South 3650 West, 
Bennion, Utah 84118. 
RITA C. GUM 
*4 ~ 
36602-001-13 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
JAMES R. GUM 
6S5 "H" Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Malt tax notice to G r a n t e e 
3<Jt)3fJl9 WARRANTY DEED 
JAMES R. GUM 
Address P r o p e r t y 
of SALT LAKE CITY 
CONVEY ind WARRANT to 
County oT SALT LAKE 
grin tor 
State of Utah, hereby 
JAMES R. GUM and RITA C. GUM, husband and wife, as joint tenants 
with full rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in co:..mon 
of SALT LAKE CITY County SALT LAKE 
fortheiumof TEN AND NO/lOOths 
AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATIONS 
framee 
, State of Utah 
- - DOLLARS 
the following described tract of land in 
State of Utah, to-wit: 
SALT LAKE County, 
BEGINNING AT THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF LOT 1, BLOCK 190, PLAT MDM, 
SALT LAKE CITY SURVEY, AND RUNNING THENCE WEST 5 RODS; THENCE NORTH 
55 FEET; THENCE EAST 5 RODS; THENCE SOUTH 55 FEET TO THE PLACE OF 
BEGINNING. 
SUBJECT TO easements, restrictions and rights of way currently of 
record and general property taxes for the year 198* and thereafter. 
WITNESS the hand of aaid grantor ,thb 2 9 t h day of 
Signed in the pretence of 
JUNE 
EST I . GUM 
P 2 
*-" "So 5 
^ rt£om 
•** - » 2 o r 
A.D. 1984 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF S A L T L A K E 
-:/v«{?/N 
fu 
X ,01Af< I'y \ 
J ss. 
On the 29thdayof JUNE A. D. 19 84 personally 
appeared before me James R, Gum, a m a r r i e d p e r s o n 
the ligner of the within immimcm who duly acknowledged 
to me that ha executed the aame. 
Notary Publi 
Residing at 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY «»«*«..»» E,«..«—6-33-85". 
s 
Cn 
SALT LAKI 3634909 
ATC ttt 
eOUNT»FUtl9i-2400 Oft«Mt244133 PARK CITY SSl-MM 
Recorded at Roqueat of. 
at M. Faa Paid $ . 
Dap. Book Paga Ref.: 
C O Mail tax notica *» GRANTEE KAAr^ 5685 So. 3650 W. 
O West Valley C i ty , Utah 84118 
S WARRANTY DEED 
£> VAL R. COYERSTONE and TERESE D. C0VERST0NE grantor 
^ of SALT LAKE CITY , County of SALT LAKE , State of Utah, haraby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
JAMES R. GUM and RITA C. GUM, husband and w i fe , as j o i n t tenants 
grantee 
of Salt Lake C i ty , County of Salt Lake, State of Utah for the sum of 
TEN AND NO/100 and other good and valuable considerations -DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in SALT LAKE County, 
State of Utah: 
Lot 72, WHITEWOOD ESTATES NO. 2, according to the o f f i c i a l p la t thereof, recorded 
1n Book 79-2 of Plats t\t Page 48, records of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Subject to a Trust Deed In favor of Western Mortgage Loan Corporation dated 
September 4 th , 1986 In the o r ig ina l pr inc ipa l amount of $69,85/.00 which Trust 
Deed the grantees herein cssume and agree to pay. 
The grantors herein assign to the grantees herein a l l of the i r r i g h t , t i t l e (\y 
and In terest 1n and to the tax and Insurance reserves. 
4 5 1 5 0 0 3 
28 AUGUST 87 0*i52 Pfl 
K A T I E L . D I X O N 
RECORDERf SALT LAKE COUNTYr UTAH 
GUARDIAN TITLE 
REC BY* REBECCA GRAY , DEPUTY 
Subject to current general taxes, easements and r e s t r i c t i o n s . 
WITNE* 
August 
I S8, tho hand of aald grantor , thla X * 6 •fc"
 Q*y of 
, A . D. 19 87 
8if nad In tha Praaanca of | Xx ^ » - — ^ - — V ^ l t ^ f T. 
VAL R. lOVERSTONE 
TERESE D. C0VERST0NE 
}~ STATE OF TOM, TEXAS Count / of 
ODtht AC da/of A"0u*t ,A. D. \W 
ptraonail/ appaarad bafora ma VAL R. C0VERST0NE 
tha alffntr of tha within lnatrumtnt, who duly aoknowladfad to ma OMrt"»-,h^ axaoutad tha "'•.jija
. _ Mf opproUtlon. axpli 
~»kA*K Of at—mpmAtm a t » Q OEM PRINT1NO CO — f AI.T kARi f trr 
•71131-fl\ 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
RONNIE PAUL MCNEVIN 
655 NORTH "H" STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84103 Space Above for Recorder's Use 
Warranty Deed 
JAMES R. GUM and RITA C. GUM, husband and wife, as 3oint tenants with full 
rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common 
of 
hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to 
RONNIE PAUL MCNEVIN, an unmarried man 
, County of , State of Utah, 
of 655 NORTH "H" STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY 
County of SALT LAKE , State of Utah for the sum of 
TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER VALUABLE CONSIDERATIONS * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
the following described tract of land in SALT LAKE County, State of Utah, to-wit 
BEGINNING at the Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 190, PLAT "D", 
Sal t Lake City, Survey, and running thence West 5 Rods; thence 
North 55 f e e t ; thence East 5 Rods; thence South 55 f ee t to the 
Place of BEGINNING. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor .this 24TH day of AUGUST 1990 
Signed in the presence of 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of 
) 
)»s. 
) 
•It & ~ 
AMES R. GUM 
RITA C. GUM 
On the day of , 1990 , personally appeared before me 
JAMES R. GUM and RITA C. GUM, husband and w i f e , as j o i n t tenants w i th f u l l 
r i g h t s of s u r v i v o r s h i p , and not as tenants i n common 
the signer s of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that THEY executed the same 
Notary Public 
My Commission expires Residing in_ 
APPROVED FORM - UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION /)-3X 
ROBERT K. MADDOCK, JR., M.D., F.A.C.P. 
Internal Medicine & Kidney Diseases 
1002 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
Telephone (801) 521-7787 
3/25/87 
Re: Rita C. Gum 
To whom it may concern: 
Mrs. Rita Gum has reported to me several injuries which she states were 
caused by her husband. On 3/25/87 she came to the office with a bruised 
L. foot. X-ray at Holy Cross Hospital revealed a fracture of proximal 
phalanyx of 5th left toe. This occured on 3/24/87 in scuffle with husband. 
Mr. Gum is also a patient of mine. He is being followed for the following 
medical problems: 
1. Diabetes mellitus. insulin requiring 
8 U Ultra Lente plus 4 U regular insulin before breakfast 
and supper. 
2. Atherosclerotic heart disease 
a. acute myocardial infarction 1/10/87 
b. status post tripple aortocoronary by-pass 2/4/87 
According to Mrs. Gum, he has had severe problems controling his anger 
since the heart surgery. He also may be having insulin reactions in the 
early morning hours as his anger seems greater when he first gets up. 
He has been offered help voluntarily, but refuses. Mrs. Gum fears for 
the safety of herself and children. The police have been called on 3 occasions 
in the past two months by one of the children, herself and a neighbor to 
report violent behavior nn his part according to Mrs. Gum. 
Hospitalization may help Mr. Gum in at least two ways. First, to determine 
if he is having insulin reactions that may be setting .off his anger. Second, 
to determine if recent coronary surgery has set off a severe psychic disturbance 
with fear, frustration, and hurt leading to anger outbursts. 
It would be better were Mr. Gum to accept hospitalization voluntarily, but he 
appears to be not disposed to this idea. 
/'. "> v-v- '^'} 
Pt-3 
CARDIOLOGY ASSOCIATES 
1002 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE #504 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
THOMAS B. KEITH, M.D., P.C., FACC THOMAS R. CALAME, M.D., P.C., FACC 
(801) 350-4628 (801) 350-4629 
November 2, 19 89 
Rita Gum 
655 H Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Rita Gum was a patient at Holy Cross Hospital from 9/22 to 9/30/89. 
I saw her in consultation at that time. Mrs. Gum has chest pain, 
which is probobly due to mitral valve prolapse, which is present 
by physical examination and on echocardiogram. A Thallium stress 
test was performed which showed no evidence for ischemic heart disease, 
The chest pain, although it is not likely to be due to coronary 
artery disease, is none the less quite limiting in terms of her 
activities. 
In addition to her mitral valve prolapse, the patient has diabetes 
melitus, which is treated by Dr. Robert Maddock. 
Sincerely yours, 
Thomas B. Keith, M.D. 
TBK/ed 
\^4SmiMj£^j^k. 
/u~ftL &< &kjrt 
.vs. 
^Attorneys for Plainmr 
No.. 4/&9A rote Bv 
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*EX W. OLSEN, #4895 
,EGAL AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE 
YTTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
225 SOUTH 200 EAST, SUITE 230 
SALT LAKE CITY/ UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE: 3 5 5 - 4 3 5 7 
Utah Spouse Abuse Act 
Form No. 5 
In the 
Of_ 
THTRf) 
SALT T.AKF, 
Q\tp. c o OU/YA 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
A fWVOi^ i^ _G Q[kxr\ 
Defendant 
_ Judicial District Court 
County, State of Utah 
vJDGF. RAYMOND S. li$Q 
Ex Parte Protective Order 
Based upon the verified Complaint on file herein and in response to an Application for Ex Parte Protective Order, 
and good cause appearing. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That defendant immediately refrain from causing, attempting to cause, or threatening physical harm to plaintiff. 
2. That defendant immediately vacate and refrain from reentering plaintiffs dwelling at ^ddr^ess): 
IZDF)^ W\. firnooV, < r ^ n I CLV o / /i W i 
3. Other deemed appropriate by the Court: 
4. That a hearing on plaintiffs Complaint will be held before a judge of the above-entitled Court on the 
\Er day of _ Q o i a h i J C 19 fifl .at the hour of 1Q;3Q A.M.. at the County 
Courthouse at Courtroom C,£
40
 East 400 South/ Salt Lake City/ Utah. 
5. That plaintiff shall have a copy of this Order together with a copy of the verified Complaint personally served 
upon the defendant at least Ciwc (5) days prior to the hearing date. 
6. That plaintiff is further ordered to cause a copy of this Order, together with a copy of the proof of service, to be 
delivered to the appropriate law enforcement agency. 
7. That unless plaintiff appears on the hearing date to show cause why the Ex Parte Protective Order should be 
extended, this Order will be automatically dissolved as of such hearing date and time. 
NOTE: This Ex Parte Protective Order is issucb! pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Spouse Abuse Act. Section 
30-6-1. ct seq.. Utah Code Annotated. 1953 as amended, without bond and without prior notice to the defendant on this 
the f* . davof. flriSfX 10 8S" a n h r h i M i r n f I °'' S"2-V.>lnrk A- M 
VIOLATION BY DEFENDANTOFTHE INJUNCTIONS AND RESTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THIS ORDER 
UPON DEFENDANT IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE CONSTITUTING A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR. 
VrTEST 
ri. DIXON MtNSLEY 
BYTH 
s/<7 SA A-*? 
3X W. OLSEN, 84895 
2GAL AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE 
CTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
15 SOUTH 200 EAST, SUITE 230 
\LT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
2LEPHONE: 355-4357 
Form No. 3 
In the 
Of. 
THIRD 
SALT LAKE 
RiVa P.. 0 p o - K r \ , 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
(\ nm_oXb R ^ ouurm 
Defendant 
Judicial District Court 
. County, State of Utah 
Summons 
(Notice of Application for Protective Order) 
Civil No. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO T H E ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: 
YOU ARE HEREBY notified that a Complaint has been filed with the above-named Court seeking relief against 
you pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Spouse Abuse Act. Section 30-6-1. etscq.. Utah Code Annotated. A copy of 
the Complaint together with a copy of an Ex Parte Protective Order, if such has been issued, are attached to this 
Summons and herewith served upon you. 
You are further notified that a hearing concerning Plaintiffs Complaint will be held on 
19 88 a t t h c h o u r o f _ 1 0 £ 3 0 _ 
f\o k^o i\ \9C 
.M. in the County Courthouse at C o u r t r o o m C, 240 E . 4 0 0 S . , SLC, 
before a Judge of the Court. 
You arc required to file an answer in writing to the Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court prior to the 
hearing date and to deliver or mail a copy of your answer to plaintiff. Failure to file such an answer and failure to appear 
at the hearing may result in the granting of the relief requested by plaintiff by default. 
You may petition the Court for an earlier hearing date if you so desire. 
DATED this 7 ^ dav of O 4r> &>JT . 19 JE£T 
Defendant's Address: 
REXVW. OLSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Utah Spouse Abuse Act 
W. OLSEN, £4895 Form No. 4 
L^ AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE 
DRNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
SOUTH 200 EAST, SUITE 230 
r LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
3PHONE: 355-4357 
In the THIRD Judicial District Court 
Of SALT T.AKK County, State of Utah 
itiff / 
Affidavit of Impecuniosity 
Plain
o;m<L£> 
STATE OF UTAH 
• L o i U m ) civi! No. ^ 0 < / O t , 5 - 3 */ Sfy 
Defendant 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SAT.T T.AKF 
On this - „ 19 ^8 . personally appeared before mc 
. who being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
(Affiant) 
1. I am the plaintiff in the above-described legal action brought pursuant to Utah Code Annotated. Section 30-6-1. 
ct scg. 
2. I do solemnly swear that owing to my poverty I am unable to bear the expenses of the legal proceedings which I 
am about to commence, and that I verily believe I am justly entitled to the relief sought by such legal proceedings. 
C^rS 
n . . . . S a l e Lake County Residing at ±_ 
Affiant-Plaintiff / I . 
nOAJ\_ I ., \\\C\ LJ\/jL)rt/lQ 
Notary Public (J 
My Commission Expires: 
A-1Q 
x y . OLSE::, g4895 
CAL AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE 
7CRNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
5 SOOTH 200 EAST/ SUITE 230 
LT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
LEPHONE: 3 5 5 - 4 3 5 7 
Utah Spouse Abuse Act 
Form No. 1 
^ 
'V 
In the THIRD 
O f SALT LAKE 
Pw4a . L . foiuno 
Plaintiff 
XI VY^O^ K- Coijum 
Defendant 
Judicial District Court 
County, State of Utah 
Complaint 
Civil No. 
.IUDGE RAYMOND s. urn 
Plaintiff states as follows: 
1. This Complaint is filed pursuant to the Utah Spouse Abuse Act, Section 30-6-1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated 
(1979). 
2. I am a resident of vDtV V \ v (\ Y^J) County, State of __ — .The acts of 
abuse complained of herein took place in . . County. State of Utah. 
3. Defendant and I arc both adult family members as defined by the Spouse Abuse Act. 
4. Defendant and I arc joint parents of the following minor children. (State the names and ages of each child and 
with whom that child is presently living): 
liCL 
-CLin 
flfiO I Q I I I A 
C^\)JCf\ _£L " ? l c i i n \ \ ? C 
M J L * T \ Jd. 
5. On or about. cfendant attempted to cause, or intentionally 
or knowingly caused, mc physical harm, and/or intentionally placed mc in fear of imminent physical harm. 
(Specifically describe act(s) of abuse): 
f\tt\cV S K a V.i JY\.A CCL£ niAJ)r. ^Jr
 ;
 VGQA'.M -k\ 
J1LS U\a)r Wo vhVTn(M L k o , Jr> VT i 0 0 pn 0 -
A-A.O 
CtJKxtu**;t-i* uciuio^d <M . Tinic^^ii: ^r.'jicr ir.ut ueiendaiu wiii continue 10 aouse me M\ 
. P X I O I bciiomj: this arc (describe): 
rtn/i Ainu A MID LO'CUA ry\ Q jrc\ ^ a o ^a f t -A-
7. I ask this Court to immediately issue an Ex Parte Protective Order, without notice to defendant, restraining and 
ljoining defendant as follows (check and fill in appropriate spaces): 
A. Prohibiting defendant from causing, attempting to cause or threatening physical harm to 
me. 
f\ B. Ordering defendant to immediately vacate my dwelling at (address): 
U P ) 6 U • 5^-tn o o \
 : >5aM LpJ^ Oil IA ,(1 in \, 
p C. Ordering defendant to refrain from entering my dwelling at (address): 
8. I further ask this Court to set a date and lime, within the next ten days, for further hearing on this Complaint. 
9. At that hearing, I ask the Court to issue an Order of Protection granting me the following relief (check and fill in 
I spaces that apply): 
X 
A. Prohibit defendant from causing, attempting to cause or threatening physical harm to me. 
A B. Order defendant to vacate by dwelling at (address): 
Y C. Order defendant to refrain from entering by dwelling at (address): dcr dcicndant to retrain irom entering by dwelling at (address): 
/^ D. Orderdefcndant tn pay m<Mrmpnrary <:nppnrt in fhramnnnt nfS fj /0£) 0 ' ^p<rmnn(h 
X E. Order defendant to pay my court costs; and r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . 
F. Order defendant to pay medical expenses incurred and other damages suffered as a result of 
the abuse. 
O. Other relief as the Court deems appropriate: 
WHEREFORE- I ask the Court to grant me relief as follows: (check apropriatc spaces) 
X I. Set a date and time, within the next ten days, for a hearing on this Complaint, which shall be 
_ . 19 § § at thrhntirnf 1 0 : 3 0 A. M 
2. Issue an immediate Ex Parte Protective Order granting me the rclicfasked for in paragraph seven above. 
3. After the hearing on the Complaint, issue a Protective Order granting me the relief asked for in 
aragraph nine above. 
% 4. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
Dated this 
ZfJjLs / S • >&JsrfLs 
7 ? / / / J /<? (Iu. Plaintiff 
ss. 
Verification 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF S a l t Lake 
On this day of . — , personally appeared before mc 
a notary public, who being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says that she/he is the (Name of Plaintiff) 
plaintiff in the above-entitled matter; that she/he has read the Complaint, and that the allegations set forth therein arc 
rue and correct of her/his own information and knowledge, and that she/he believes she/he is entitled to the relief 
Draycd for, and that said legal action is not instigated for harrassment, abuse of process or delay. 
r - - ^ Plaintiff » i , 
4^/)&njx I..- Wuyf-OCMld 
Notary Public 
Residing at Sa l t Lake County 
* 
My Commission Expires: 
Seal) 
:X W. OLSEN, #4895 
,GAL AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE 
TORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
5 SOUTH 200 EAST, SUITE 230 
LT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
LEPHONE: 355-4357 
Utah Spouse Abuse Act 
Form No. 2 
In the 
Of_ 
THIRD 
SALT LAKE 
ft;u o.. o mum Plaintiff 
QJYTUIP> rrc\_ 
Defendant 
_ Judicial District Court 
County, State of Utah 
Application for Ex Parte 
Protective Order ,. _ A 
a*HO.2L&2A&I2Y SA 
COMES NOW plaintiff in the above-entitled action and pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated. Section 30-6-5 (2). makes application for an Ex Parte Protective Order immediately restraining and 
enjoining defendant as requested in paragraph 7 of the verified Complaint attached hereto and herewith made a part of 
this Application. 
DATED this A .day of. rtrtt- 19 88 
/JCCtr^ l - * &£< VsrrT*-* 
Plaintiff 
REX W. OLSEN/ AttOi orney for Plaintiff 
David P. Coldesina, D.D.S. 
Stansbury Apartments 
211 South 7th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
General Practice of Dentistry Phone 355-3151 
01/17/91 
To Whom It May Concern: 
T*f*ct 
On or about December 17f 1990. Jcwuy Gum contacted our 
office by leaving a message on our answering machine 
stating that he was not responsible for dental treatment 
done 12/03/90 and 12/05/90 on Amy Gum without previous 
knowledge of her coming in to our office. We saw Amy 
on an emergency basis which is hard to make previous 
arrangements with Mr. Gum. I called Mrs. Gum and explained 
this to her and she agreed to pay for services rendered. 
Sincerely, 
David P. Coldesina office manager/Janet Turner 
FF3C ( 1 9 0 3 0 3 6 2 ) 
- D r * O a v i d P . C o l d e s m a 
P.O. Box 4 0 3 0 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , LT 8 4 1 1 0 - 5 0 3 0 ______ 
DATE 
_ 2 / 1 1 / 9 0 
STATEMENT DATE 
1 0 1 / 0 2 / 9 1 
PATIEfMT 
M i n i m UP. Pmt 
3 0 DAYS 
9 1 . 0 0 
FPSC Bl Bl BkW ^ 4 1 
FIRST PROFESSIONAL SERVICES CORP 
1 A division of First Professional Bank 
DESCRIPTION 
B a l a n c e F c r w a r d 
PAYMENTB/CHAPJIESJ 
91 . 0 0 
i s <S30.-;0 P l e a s e Pav b e f o r e -. t / i ^ / ? l ! 
SO DAYS | OVER SO DAYS FINANCE CHARGES E M ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ T ^ ^ B T ^ E I 
•. CO * 1 . 0 0 | 
< DETACH HERE AND RETURN BOTTOM STUB WITH REMITTANCE • 
FPSC (19030862) 
-Dr. David P. Coldesina 
P.O. Box 4050 
Salt Lak> City, UT 84110-4030 
Pa 3e i 
* 139T: 
R i t a 
io~:<* 
Bum 
E 9 0 0 
F e n m o n * 
S 
UT 3 4 1 0 3 
(lo J) 9'<2L'^0 ~~T$^° CJ^cA J U ^ > /hJ&* lo&Ssrs QOyaJUj. 
lsa,w>i,. 
$106 
6^ ma)M 
SERVICE CORPORATION 
M v^ r 7sTtTMSP 
1100 WAUNUT STREET \ '* K 
P O BOX 989 
OWENSBORO, KY 42302-0989 
F C ^ PAYMENT LF t b C R u - i fG MCiUGAGQR 
34 
I O E 
A M O U N T 
PAY TO J A i-l L S R 0 U M 
THE ORDER I T A C ObM 
OF >6cib SO 3 6 5 0 wEST 
btNNION 
PAYCE X417732 
UT 84118 
$*4-^<: 0 0 * * 2 , 345 • 75 
*4s/t VQIO IF NOT CASHED WITHIN 90 DAYS 
IBTOST N A T I O N ^ Si 
"•awass?"1 uoa30000s&i: ?m o&S2 a»* 
_ i y.1 UJ». . . A , . 
GOTIABU 
* * ^ ••*,-* ft8* , y * SB 
THIHD DISTHI:T crjRi 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Rita C. Gam 
Ko^p90- 4901065 
vs 
Judge John A. Rockish 
James Richard Gum 
Supplement to complainfi and 
p-rtisl response to Defandt's 
Counter offer of July 25. 1990, 
My attorneys ha^^withdrawn, and I am so depleted 
financially that I am unatle to incur further attorney's 
expenses, and therefore choose to represent myself and file 
this for myself. 
or 
1. Divorce ( to eithe? party,/both) :agreed . 
2. Castody of children to me (or as they choose) 
with liberal an^ coopefative rights of visitation in 
accordance with convenience and desire. 
3. The family home has been sold; the remainder due 
the parties should be divided between the parties ^should 
bfee court so decide,and proportions thereof. 
4. Surnort m?ney*£or the children in accord with the 
guidelines rr-f erred/7 cbr as determined by the court, is 
agreeable to mej to be paid through Recovery Services. 
5. ICo alimony to either party is likewise agreeble. 
6. As to other problems about which the jnay be lack 
of understanding or dispute; it is requested'that the 
c^urt, after full examination and consideration, resolve 
them as his sense of equity and justice dictate*! 
I offer full cooperation; but my work is irregular, 
only as cplled, so some prior notice is r'esireable 
as to any hea: ings I may be required to attend. 
Respectfully submitted 
Rita C. Gum 
I certify that I have fi^e* a copy of the above 
w? th the court clerk; and have served a copy on the def-
an^ant, an^ upon his attorney Glen Richman. 
Uen M. Richman 
RICHMAN b RICHMAN 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801)532-8844 
Rarbara W. Richman 
(of counsel) 
July 2 5 , 1990 
Mr. Earl S. Sp&fford 
Attorney at Law 
425 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Gum vs. Gum 
Dear Ear 1: 
A flf; '/ 
As you know, I have been out of town for several days. I 
informed you before leaving when we discussed you putting your 
client's offer in writing. This letter is my response to that 
offer. 
My client may be willing to pay $3,000.00 to resolve the / 
whole matter which would include the following: * *?, \ 
1. Your client immediately vacating the home; 
2. Executing a deed in favor of my client having all ^*t*~ 
right, title and interest in and to said home; 
3. Leaving the home in good condition? 
4. Signing a stipulation and having the decree entered 
waiving alimony to each party; 
5. Entering an order of support for the children based 
upon the Utah Child Support Schedule, with your client having 
custody of the children with reasonable rights of visitation in 
Mr. Gum; 
6. Your client would waive all right, title and interest 
in and to any of the retirement or other assets exclusive of 
household items and furniture which the parties should divide 
equi tably; 
Each party would pay their separate costs and fees. 
A-AB 
Mr. Earl S. SpaFford 
July 25, 1990 
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I have not discussed the $3,000.00 amount specifically with 
my client, but had previously been authorized to offer $2,000.00 
under the same conditions when Mr. Welker was counsel for the 
plaintiff. I would urge upon my client to increase that offer to 
$3,000.00 and I believe he would accept that advice if it is 
acceptable to your client. Make no mistake, your client has not 
been of-C&red $2,000.00 or $3,000.00 or any number of dollars just 
to vacate the house. 
If this counter proposal is not acceptable as I have 
specified in this letter, please let me know by telephone since I 
intend to press forward on your Motion for Rehearing and For a 
Stay. 
I have been informed that your client has refused to move ;U 
From the house. 
Sincerely yours, 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
GLEN M. RICHMAN 
Attorney at Law 
GMR 511 
cc J. R. Gum 
A - VIO 
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FIVE O'CLOCK. 
THE COURT: LET ME TELL-- LET ME START OUT 
RIGHT NOW-- A LOT OF THIS PRELIMINARY STUFF, IT IS A 
BENCH TRIAL AND I'M WILLING TO LISTEN TO IT. SO UNLESS 
IT IS SOMETHING OF REAL MATERIAL VALUE— 
MR. SPAFFORD: I DON'T KNOW WHERE HE'S 
GOING, YOUR HONOR, BUT I WANT THE RECORD TO REFLECT 
THAT IT IS NOT RELEVANT TO THIS CASE. 
THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND THAT. IT'S JUST 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION; THAT'S ALL. 
MR. SPAFFORD: AS LONG AS THE COURT DOESN'T 
TAKE IT FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE, I HAVE NO PROBLEM. 
THE COURT: MOST OF THE CASES GIVE ME 
BACKGROUND. DON'T WORRY ABOUT THAT. IF IT'S A JURY 
TRIAL, FINE. THAT'S A DIFFERENT SITUATION. BUT MY 
DECISION IS NOT GOING TO BE MADE ON WHETHER SOMEONE HAS 
BEEN MARRIED BEFORE OR NOT. IT'S WHAT I HAVE BEFORE ME 
TODAY. 
OKAY. GO AHEAD. 
MR. RICHMAN: WELL, YOU SEE THAT HASN'T BEEN 
EFFECTIVE, YOUR HONOR. I DON'T WANT THAT. I WILL 
PROFFER TO THE COURT WHAT THIS IS FOR, AND IT IS 
RELEVANT TO MR. GUM. 
Q. (BY MR. RICHMAN) MR. GUM, WHEN YOU WERE 
MARRIED TO YOUR FIRST WIFE DID YOU PURCHASE A HOME? 
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A. YES, I DID. 
0. WHERE IS THAT HOME? 
A. 635 H STREET HERE IN SALT LAKE CITY. 
Q. AND WHOSE MONEY DID YOU USE TO PURCHASE 
THAT HOME? 
A. MY MONEY. 
Q. AND IS THAT WHERE THE PLAINTIFF IS RESIDING 
A. YES. 
0. WAS THE HOUSE REMODELED AFTER YOU HARRIED 
THIS PRESENT WIFE, RITA GUM? 
A. YES, IT WAS. 
Q. AND WHOSE MONEY WAS USED TO REMODEL THE 
HOUSE? 
A. MY MONEY. 
0. WAS IT FROM YOUR EARNINGS AT WORK? 
A. EARNINGS, MY EARNINGS. 
Q. AND SAVINGS? 
A. AND SAVINGS. 
Q. AND WAS THERE ANY MONEY AT ANY TIME 
PROVIDED TO YOU BY RITA GUM, THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS 
ACTION, TO REMODEL OR PURCHASE OR DO ANYTHING TOWARD 
THE UPKEEP OF THIS HOUSE? 
A. NONE WHATSOEVER. 
Q. AND THIS IS YOUR THIRD DIVORCE ACTION 
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AND THE ORDER HAD BEEN ENTERED? 
Q. (BY MR. SPAFFORD) LET ME PUT IT THIS WAY. 
WHERE WOULD YOU GO IF YOU MOVED OUT? 
A. I DON'T HAVE ANYPLACE TO GO. 
THE COURT: THAT'S IMMATERIAL. 
MR. SPAFFORD: IT GOES TO THE ISSUE OF 
CONTEMPT, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: LET'S FIND OUT WHY SHE DOESN'T 
MOVE OUT, NOT WHERE SHE'S GOING TO GO. 
Q. (BY MR. SPAFFORD) WHY HAVEN'T YOU MOVED 
OUT? 
A. I DON'T HAVE ANYPLACE TO GO. I DON'T HAVE 
ANY MONEY TO GO ANYPLACE. 
Q. YOU HAVE A JOB, DON'T YOU? 
A. YES. 
MR. RICHMAN: JUST A MOMENT. WE WERE NOT 
ALLOWED TO GO INTO THESE KINDS THINGS WITH HIM. HE 
DOESN'T HAVE ANY PLACE TO GO EITHER. 
THE COURT: WELL, WHERE SHE GOES IS 
IMMATERIAL AS FAR AS I'M CONCERNED. 
MR. SPAFFORD: LET ME MAKE A PROFFER, YOUR 
HONOR, TO SAVE A LOT OF TIME. 
MY PROFFER IS THAT SHE EARNS LESS THAN $600 A 
MONTH; HE EARNS $3,000 MONTH. THIS COUPLE HAS TWO 
HOMES. THE ONE IS THE EXHIBIT 9-P WHICH IS THE HOME 
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THEY'RE LIVING IN. IT IS OWNED JOINTLY BY THEM, AND 
WHILE ADMITTEDLY IT WAS ACQUIRED PRIOR TO THE MARRIAGE, 
DURING THE MARRIAGE FROM MARITAL ASSETS THE HOME WAS 
REMODELED. INDEED IT WAS CONVEYED TO HER JOINTLY WITH 
HIM, SO SHE'S HAS AN EQUITABLE INTEREST IN THE 
PROPERTY. 
THEY HAVE A SECOND PIECE OF PROPERTY IN SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, THE LOT "2, WHITEWOOD ESTATES, ANOTHER 
HOME WHICH IS ALSO DEEDED TO THE TWO PARTIES JOINTLY. 
MR. GUM HAS PLACED, UNDER A RENTAL AGREEMENT, HIS SON 
IN THE SECOND PIECE PROPERTY, AND HE IS COLLECTING THE 
RENT ON IT. 
SO EFFECTIVELY, YOUR ORDER DISPOSSESSES HER 
OF THE HOME SHE'S LIVING IN AND EFFECTIVELY GRANTS HIM 
THE POSSESSION OF BOTH PIECES OF PROPERTY, TWO HOMES. 
SO WE HAVE THE LUDICROUS SITUATION OF A WOMAN 
WHO EARNS A POVERTY LEVEL WAGE, WHO HAS NO PLACE TO GO, 
AND WHO HAS AN EQUITY IN TWO SEPARATE PIECES OF 
PROPERTY; AND THE HUSBAND WINDS UP WITH BOTH PIECES OF 
PROPERTY WHILE SHE'S EFFECTIVELY PUT OUT ON THE STREET. 
THE COURT: I'LL LET YOU HAVE AN 
OPPORTUNITY— 
MR. RICHMAM: LET ME MAKE AN OBSERVATION. 
MR. SPAFFORD: MAY I FINISH. 
THE COURT: LET HIM FINISH. 
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SIR 
Q. SO, THEY WOULD BE PUT OUT OF THE HOME ALSO? 
A. THEY WOULD BE PUT OUT OF THE HOME ALSO, 
MR. SPAFFORD: THAT'S ALL, YOUR HONOR. I 
SUBMIT IT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. NOW--
MR. RICHMAN: WELL, YOUR HONOR, THIS IS WHY 
I HAVE A LITTLE DIFFICULTY WITH MR. SPAFFORD. THAT WAS 
FAR BEYOND A PROFFER 
THE COURT: LET'S GO AHEAD 
MR. RICHMAN: LET ME FINISH. 
THE COURT: I CAN SORT THIS ALL OUT. 
MR. RICHMAN: I DON'T THINK SO, BECAUSE THE 
COURT COMMENTED ABOUT WHAT HE SAID AS IF THAT IS A 
FACTUAL MATTER. 
THE COURT: WE'RE GOING TO WASTE A LOT OF 
TIME HERE. I CAN SORT THIS OUT. I TOLD YOU IN THE 
FIRST INSTANCE I'M INCLINED TO HAVE HER MOVE OUT OF THE 
HOUSE. THEY HAVEN'T SHOWN ME ANY REASON WHY SHE 
SHOULDN'T BE OUT. SO, I'M NOT CONVINCED THAT THE FACT 
THAT SHE HASN'T ANY PLACE TO GO IS A REASON THAT I 
SHOULD NOT ENFORCE THE ORDER. SO, YOU KNOW-
MR. RICHMAN: MAY I MAKE PROFFER? 
THE COURT: GO AHEAD AND MAKE A PROFFER. 
LIKE I SAID, I WOULD GIVE YOU THE SAME OPPORTUNITY. 
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THE COURT: LOOK MR.— 
MR. RICHMAN: IN THE FUTURE. WHAT IS DONE 
IS DONE. 
THE COURT: IF YOU FOLLOW THE RULES OF 
PROPER PRACTICE— AND AS I SAY AGAIN, I'M NOT TRYING 
THE ATTORNEYS HERE TODAY, BUT I'M GOING TO ORDER THAT 
SHE VACATE THE HOUSE. THAT IS GOING TO BE THE ORDER. 
SHE WILL VACATE IT WITHIN TEN DAYS, AND IF SHE DOESN'T 
VACATE WITHIN 10 DAYS, THEN THE COURT WILL CITE HER FOR 
CONTEMPT. 
AND THAT DOESN'T MEAN MR. GUM IS GOING TO 
TAKE IT OVER AND LIVE IN IT. THAT HOUSE HAS GOT TO BE 
SOLD IMMEDIATELY. IF IT HASN'T SOLD, THE PRICE IS TOO 
HIGH. SOMETHING IS THE MATTER. SO, HE'S NOT GOING TO 
TAKE IT AMD BE IN THE SAME POSITION THAT SHE'S IS, TO 
LIVE IN THE HOUSE AND NOT GET IT SOLD. THE HOUSE IS 
GOING TO BE SOLD. 
AND SO, THEREFORE, WHEN YOU MOVE IN, OR SHE 
REMAINS, THAT'S UP TO YOU TWO YOU TO DECIDE, THE HOUSE 
HAS TO BE PLACED IN A CONDITION SO IT CAN BE SOLD AND 
THE PROCEEDS WE'LL TAKE CARE OF AT A SUBSEQUENT DATE. 
BUT SHE HAS TEN DAYS TO GET MOVED, AND YOU 
HAVE TEN DAYS TO GET THE HOUSE IN SHAPE SO IT CAN BE 
SOLD. SO, THEREFORE, I DON'T THINK IT WOULD BE WISE 
FOR YOU TO MOVE INTO IT IF YOU'RE ONLY GOING TO LIVE 
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SAME PROBLEM WE HAVE HERE TODAY. AND I CAN SEE THE 
PARTIES WILL NOT COOPERATE. SO I'M NOT GOING TO TREAT 
HIM ANY DIFFERENTLY THAN I'M TREATING HER. HE CAN TAKE 
POSSESSION. 
AND IF YOU NEED MORE THAN TEN DAYS TO GET IT 
IN CONDITION, FINE. BUT THERE IS NO NEED TO BE MOVING 
INTO IT BECAUSE YOU'RE GOING TO BE OUT OF IT SHORTLY 
THEREAFTER. 
MR. RICHMAN: I'M TOLD, AND MAYBE IT'S 
INCORRECT, BUT I'M TOLD BY REALTORS THAT HOUSES SELL 
BETTER WHEN THEY'RE OCCUPIED. 
THE COURT: IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, AS I SEE 
IT, AND I AGREE WITH YOU-- I AGREE WITH YOU, BUT THERE 
IS NO NEED OF US BEING BACK IN ANOTHER 2 0 OR 60 DAYS. 
SO, YOU JUST 3ETT5R MAKE YOUR 3EST EFFORTS TO GET THE 
HOUSE IN CONDITION AND GET IT SOLD AND RESOLVE THIS 
PROBLEM. THAT'S WHAT I SEE IS GOING TO BE DONE. 
MR. RICHMAN: HE HAS FAITHFULLY PAID THE 
MORTGAGE AS PART OF THE ORDER. I PROFFER TO YOU THAT 
HE HAS FAITHFULLY PAID CHILD SUPPORT. 
THE COURT: I'M GIVING— 
MR. RICHMAN: IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE'RE 
PUNISHING HIM FOR HER ACTS. HE COULD HAVE HAD THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO GET IT READY--
THE COURT: OKAY. DO YOU NEED 30 DAYS TO 
2 
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5 
6 
7 
3 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
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17 
18 
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$375. SHE IS WILLING TO RECEIVE IT, BUT NOT AS A FINAL 
SETTLEMENT. 
THE COURT: NO, IT IS NOT A FINAL 
SETTLEMENT. HE'S JUST SAYING THAT SHE'S ENTITLED TO 
X-NUMBER OF DOLLARS PER THEIR AGREEMENT. AND IF YOU'RE 
NOT SATISFIED WITH THAT AFTER LOOKING AT THE TAX 
RETURNS, COME DOWN HERE. YOU DON'T EVEN NEED TO BRING 
YOUR CLIENTS. JUST BRING THE TAX RETURN AND YOU CAN 
SHOW-- MR. RICHMAII WILL SHOW YOU WHAT HE WOULD HAVE 
RECEIVED HAD HE NOT FILED JOINTLY. BY FILING JOINTLY 
HE'S PICKING UP THREE OR FOUR HUNDRED DOLLARS WHICH 
HE'S WILLING TO GIVE HER HALF. 
MR. RICHMAM: NO. HE'S WILLING TO GIVE HER 
ALL. 
THE COURT: OH. ALL, ALL OF IT. THAT'S 
FINE. 
MR. SPAFFORD: THAT'S WHAT THE CONFUSION IS. 
DON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH THAT. 
THE COURT: YOU PREPARE THE ORDER, 
MR. RICHMAN. 
MR. RICHMAN: I AM. 
THE COURT: MR. SPAFFORD, YOU CAN APPROVE IT 
AS TO FORM. 
NOW, LET ME TELL YOU, IF SHE'S NOT OUT IN TEN 
DAYS, I WILL TAKE THE ACTION THAT I HAVE TO TAKE. AND 
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IF HE'S NOT OUT IN 30 DAYS— 
MR. SPAFFORD: SAME THING. 
THE COURT: SAME THING. 
MR. RICHMAN: COULD WE HAVE AN ORDER THAT 
THERE BE NO DAMAGE DONE TO THE HOUSE?. 
THE COURT: ABSOLUTELY. THE HOUSE WILL BE 
LEFT IN AS GOOD A CONDITION AS IT IS NOW. AND YOU'RE 
NOT TO DO-- AND NEITHER PARTY WILL IN ANY WAY DIMINISH 
THE VALUE OF THAT PROPERTY DURING THESE PROCEEDINGS 
EITHER. 
MR. RICHMAN: AND ONE OTHER-
MR. SPAFFORD: THAT'S REASONABLE. 
MR. RICHMAN: ONE OTHER HOUSE CLEANING 
THING. ALL OF HIS FINANCIAL PAPERS, WE MADE A REQUEST 
FOR THOSE. 
THE COURT: YOU'RE TO GET ALL OF THEM. 
MR. RICHMAN: WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THOSE 
LEFT IN THE HOUSE. 
IS THAT WHAT YOU WANT? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES. 
THE COURT: LEAVE ALL THE FINANCIAL PAPERS 
IN THE HOUSE. MAKE THAT PART OF THE ORDER. 
AND I WILL TELL YOU I'M GOING TO ENFORCE 
THESE ORDERS. SO THAT'S ALL THERE IS TO IT. 
OKAY. COURT'S IN RECESS. 
DIVORCE 30-3-5 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children — Court to have con-
tinuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — 
Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious peti-
tion for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble orders relating to the children, property, and parties. The court shall 
include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; and 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependent children. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the dis-
tribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his 
rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions 
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay 
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, 
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in 
good faith. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L. added Subsection (2); designated two undesig-
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. nated paragraphs as Subsections (3) and (4); 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; inserted "In determining" and "the court" in 
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. Subsection (4); redesignated former Subsec-
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1. tions < 2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6); di-
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- vided Subsection (5) into two sentences, substi-
ment by Chapter 72 rewrote Subsection (1); tuting "However, if the remarriage" for "unless 
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30-3-7. When decree becomes absolute. 
The decree of divorce becomes absolute on the date it is signed by the court 
and entered by the clerk in the register of actions or at the expiration of a 
period of time the court may specifically designate, unless an appeal or other 
proceedings for review are pending or the court, before the decree becomes 
absolute, for sufficient cause otherwise orders. The court, upon application or 
on its own motion for good cause shown, may waive, alter, or extend a desig-
nated period of time before the decree becomes absolute, but not to exceed six 
months from the signing and entry of the decree. 
30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful. 
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dissolves their marriage by 
decree may marry any person other than the spouse from whom the divorce 
was granted until it becomes absolute. If an appeal is taken, the divorce is not 
absolute until after affirmance of the decree. 
30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order — Judg-
ment. 
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support under any child 
support order, as defined by Subsection 62A-11-40M3), is, on and after the 
date it is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a 
district court, except as provided in Subsection (2); 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in this and in any 
other jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any other jurisdic-
tion, except as provided in Subsection (2). 
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may be 
modified with respect to any period during which a petition for modification is 
pending, but only from the date notice of that petition was given to the obli-
gee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the 
petitioner. 
(3) For purposes of this section, jurisdiction" means a state or political 
subdivision, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(4) The judgment provided for in Subsection (l)(a), to be effective and en-
forceable as a lien against the real property interest of any third party relying 
on the public record, shall be docketed in the district court in accordance with 
Sections 78-22-1 and 62A-11-311. 
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE 
Section Section 
30-4-1. Action by spouse — Grounds. 30-4-4. Restraining disposal of property. 
30-4-2. Procedure — Venue. 30-4-5. Rights and remedies — Imprison-
30-4-3. Custody and maintenance of chil- ment of husband or wife, 
dren — Property division and sup-
port payments. 
30-4-1. Action by spouse — Grounds. 
Whenever a resident of this state shall have deserted a spouse without good 
and sufficient cause, or being of sufficient ability to provide support shall have 
neglected or refused to properly provide for and suitably maintain that 
spouse, or having property within this state and the spouse being a resident of 
this state shall have so deserted or neglected or refused to provide such sup-
port or where a married person without that person's fault lives separate and 
apart from that spouse, the district court shall, on the filing of a complaint 
therefor, allot, assign, set apart and decree as alimony the use of such part of 
the real and personal estate or earnings of the deserting spouse as the court 
may determine in its discretion; and during the pendency of the proceedings 
the court may require that deserting spouse to pay such sums for costs, ex-
penses and attorneys, fees, and for the support of either spouse, as it shall 
deem necessary and proper in the same manner as in actions for divorce. 
30-4-3. Custody and maintenance of children — Property 
division and support payments. 
In all actions brought hereunder the court may by order or decree provide 
for the care, custody and maintenance of the minor children of the parties and 
may determine with which of the parties the children or any of them shall 
remain; may award to either spouse possession of any of the real or personal 
estate of the other spouse, and decree moneys for support of that spouse and 
the support of the minor children, and provide how and when payments shall 
be made, and that either spouse have a lien upon the property of the other to 
secure payment of the same. Such orders and decrees may be enforced by sale 
of any property of the spouse or by contempt proceedings or otherwise as may 
be necessary. The court may change the allowance from time to time accord-
ing to circumstances, and may terminate altogether any allowance made upon 
satisfactory proof of voluntary and permanent reconciliation. Such allowance 
shall, however, in every case be only during the joint lives of the husband and 
wife. 
30-6-2. Abuse or danger of abuse — Complaint and protec-
tive orders authorized. 
Any person who has been subjected to abuse, or to whom there is a substan-
tial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse, is entitled to file a complaint and 
seek protective orders as provided by this chapter, whether or not that person 
has left the residence in an effort to avoid further abuse. 
30-6-4. Assistance by court clerk and county attorney — 
Affidavits of impecuniosity. 
(1) The offices of the court clerk and the county attorney shall provide 
forms and nonlegal assistance to persons seeking to proceed under this chap-
ter. By mutual agreement either office may be the sole provider of those 
services. 
(2) If the person seeking to proceed under this chapter is not represented by 
an attorney, that person shall be informed of the following: 
(a) the right to file an affidavit of impecuniosity, and the requirements 
for such filing. Assistance with an impecunious filing shall be provided to 
the plaintiff where applicable; 
(b) the means available for the service of process; atid 
(c) legal service organizations that may represent the plaintiff in an 
action brought under this chapter. 
(3) If a plaintiff has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity, no charges may be 
imposed by a district court clerk or county sheriff for: 
(a) filing a complaint; 
(b) obtaining an ex parte protective order; 
(c) obtaining copies, either certified or not certified, necessary for ser-
vice or delivery to law enforcement officials; or 
(d) service of the complaint, ex parte protective order, or protective 
order. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except, as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative 
facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determi-
nation by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether re-
quested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a 
party and supplied with the necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an 
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the 
tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request 
may be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall in-
struct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal 
case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept 
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. 
OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
Rule 701. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses. 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of 
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) 
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
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RITA C. GUM 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
1034 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801) 532-1291 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
RITA C. GUM : 
AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY 
Plaintiff and Appellant, : 
vs. : 
Civil No. D90-4901065 
JAMES RICHARD GUM : 
Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendant and Appellee. : 
oooOooo 
I, RITA C. GUM, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that owing to 
my poverty I am unable to bear the expenses of the action or legal 
proceedings which I am about to commence (or the appeal which I am 
about to take), and that I verily believe I am justly entitled to 
the relief sought by such action, legal proceedings or appeal. 
DATED this LfXk day of 6- ('T~^/^ y , 1990. 
R£TA C. GUM 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ^ff day of October, 1990. 
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
IMPECUNIOSITY to the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East 
400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; KATHY SCHULTZ, Court 
Reporter, Metropolitan Hall of Justice, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111; and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114, this Mffj&ay of October, 1990 
< • . ^ ^ C<~ ' L ' , > ^ /7 i -
RITA C. GUM 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, lfc AND .run 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH SEP 4 1984 
IN THE KATTSR o f t h e ADOPTION o f ) A~ B4-jggfrN, Wm»i'fi j ^ g 
SUSAN, CYNTHIA, AMY a n d JOY | DECREE OP ADOPTll 
BAILEY, m i n o r s . I t l kH^^S 
The p e t i t i o n o f James R i c h a r d Gum f o r t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e 
above named c h i l d r e n came on t o b e h e a r d b e f o r e H o n o r a b l e 
Kenne th R i g t r u p on Augus t 3 1 , 1 9 8 4 , Don L . Bybee and J . A l l a n 
C r o c k e t t a p p e a r e d on b e h a l f of t h e p a r t i e s and p r e s e n t e d t h e 
m a t t e r t o t h e c o u r t , and t h e c o u r t h a v i n g made i t s F i n d i n g s o f 
F a c t and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law, which a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d h e r e i n by 
r e f e r e n c e , i n a c c o r d a n c e t h e r e w i t h , i t i s h e r e b y 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED: 
That t h e f o u r c h i l d r e n above named, v.hose names and d a t e s 
of b i r t h a r e : S u s a n , ! f e r c h l 4 , 1 9 7 0 , C y n t h i a , Oc tobe r 1 4 , 1 9 7 1 , 
Amy, I'&rch 1 4 , 1975 and J o y , Sep tember 22, 1 9 7 6 , a r e adop ted by 
J a n ' e s R i c h a r d Gum,with a l l r i g h t s and d u t i e s he v.ould have t o h i s 
own n a t u r a l c h i l d r e n , i n c l u d i n g t o s u p p o r t , m a i n t a i n and e d u c a t e 
them and t r e a t them i n a l l r e s p e c t s a s h i s own c h i l d r e n ; and t h e y t o 
have a l l of t h e p r i v e l e g e s end o b l i g a t i o n s of c h i l d r e n and 
p a r e n t t o h im; and 
That t h e i r names a r e h e r e b y changed t o each of t h e i r 
f i r s t names above s t a t e d and t h e surname " Gum " . 
S igned t h i s tj ""day of September 1984 . 
[enneth B. 
r-AT-.-t-v-' }„ ' D i s t r i c t 
o. -. .-„v- - J u d - e 
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